MYTHS AND REALITIES

Letter to a London Friend
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The fundamental issue in any discussion of the affairs of Uganda is the gap between myths and realities. Friends of Uganda, detractors, visiting journalists and academics have, since the Independence of the country, tended to give emphasis on myths and under-rated realities. There are several reasons for this tendency, but two of them stand out. There is first the general weakness on the part of interested persons mostly from foreign countries to explain Uganda of today or Independent Uganda through her past or pre-Independence situation and, secondly, the reticence of the Independent Government of Uganda to publicise Uganda overseas. The fact of the second reason leaves the field to the first, and writers and academics from abroad therefore find it much easier than otherwise to make superficial assessment of Uganda and to conclude that changes as have taken place since the day of Independence have not been such as to change fundamentally the nature of forces operating in Uganda. This, I believe, is incorrect.

It is my view that Uganda as it was between 1962 and 1966 was very different from the Uganda of pre-Independence days and that Uganda of today is equally very different from Uganda of 1962 to 1966. These differences are not only political but also cover the whole range of the image of Uganda, including economic and social services. There are a few landmarks in the political field which would indicate and, I hope, prove my contention that Uganda has been changing all the time and that to see her through the past is to miss vital new developments. I can describe briefly some of these landmarks.

In 1961 the UPC which was and remains a Leftist Party, formed an alliance with Kabaka Yekka, a Right-Wing Party, and the result of that arrangement was not disastrous to the UPC in the General Elections of 1962. The General Election results as announced by the Returning Officer in 1961 gave UPC 35 seats, which later came to 36 as a result of a bye-election. All but one of these seats were in constituencies outside Buganda Region. In 1962 the results of the General Election announced by the Returning Officer gave the UPC 37 seats, which later came to 38 as a result of a bye-election. You will observe, therefore, that within a year the UPC increased its number of seats in the National Assembly from 36 to 38.

The politics of Uganda at that time were very much against a nationalist party associating with Kabaka Yekka. The UPC, however, did so in order that the people in Buganda Region, because of a ruling by the Kabaka and the Mengo Lukiko boycotted the 1961 Elections, should participate in the Elections of 1962 even in an indirect manner. This was the only possible practical way to ensure political stability in the country and recognition of the National Assembly by every part of the country, both of which were essential for the achievement of Independence. The alliance between the UPC and KY could have had a most disastrous effect on UPC amongst the electorate in the 1962 General Elections. This is because at that time it needed foresight and boldness in the rest of the country outside Buganda to compromise on Party policy and identity in order to ensure political stability and recognition of the National Assembly by all parts of the country. That foresight and boldness were elements in the UPC election platform in 1962. It is true that a substantial number of UPC leading members and supporters did not favour the alliance with KY and that only indicates the degree of opposition which the rest of the country entertained in regard to Buganda's special position. Some journalists, even in 1968, have written articles which do not fit into this position, in that they have attempted to represent that Buganda and some parts of Uganda, principally the former Kingdom areas and other Bantu areas, have always been together in their opposition to the Northerners. That type of representation is a myth. But the UPC/KY alliance, which, according to the political situation obtaining in Uganda in 1961, should have ended in an electoral humiliation for the UPC, proved the resilience and the strength of the Party, and therefore the alliance became a landmark in our endeavours to bring about understanding, stability and unity in Uganda.

In 1963 the strength of the UPC was once again tested when the Party rejected any of its members to be elected to the office of the President, and instead adopted Sir Edward Mutesa for the office. This decision was not favoured by all the contenders to the office. The Rulers of Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Busoga met at Mbarara and selected a candidate for the office of the President. Their candidate was not Sir Edward. You will note that all the Rulers were Bantu and yet they could not accept Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, as President. The Democratic Party also did not accept Sir Edward, but the UPC succeeded once more to destroy tribal suspicions, and Sir Edward was elected President. After the election, and despite the fact that the other Rulers did not want Sir Edward to be President, the strength of UPC outside Buganda was not affected in any way. Indeed, the Party increased its popularity: so much so that when elections to Federal Assemblies in Bunyoro and Toro, and District Councils throughout the country were held in 1964, the UPC won convincingly in all areas. All this constituted another landmark towards national unity, with the UPC in the vanguard.

The 'Lost Counties' was a serious political issue both before Independence and after, up to the middle of 1964. The UPC took a decision to implement the constitutional provision which required the holding of a referendum. Although speeches in the Mengo Lukiko included statements to the effect that the issue of the 'Lost Counties' could only be resolved through bloodshed, the issue of the 'Lost Counties' was settled constitutionally. That must certainly be another landmark in the changing Uganda, and it is a landmark that indicates quite clearly that although it was possible in those days to seek the co-operation of Buganda (Mengo) it was not essential to comply with their wishes. What they considered fundamental to them but not to Uganda, the UPC on national grounds rejected the same. Those who dealt with myths when discussing the affairs of Uganda, and represented that unless Mengo agreed to comply with their wishes. What they considered fundamental to them but not to Uganda, the UPC on national grounds rejected that indicates quite clearly that although it was possible in those days to seek the co-operation of Buganda (Mengo) it was not essential to comply with their wishes. That type of representation is a myth. But the UPC/KY alliance, which, according to the political situation obtaining in Uganda in 1961, should have ended in an electoral humiliation for the UPC, proved the resilience and the strength of the Party, and therefore the alliance became a landmark in our endeavours to bring about understanding, stability and unity in Uganda.

In 1964, the government of Uganda was impotent have always missed this vital point. Perhaps another landmark is that although the UPC was in alliance with KY in 1964, the fact did not prevent the UPC from opening branches in Buganda Region in defiance of representations and opposition from Mengo. The opening of UPC branches in Buganda Region in defiance of those representations and opposition from Mengo (Kabaka's Government) and the KY as a political force, illustrates the characteristic of the UPC to make every endeavour to work for the interests of Uganda as a whole, and that the alliance with KY then did not in the opinion of the Party, amount to a charter which debarred the UPC from operating in Buganda.
The Party has never wanted any part of its policy to be determined by another body outside itself, and the attempt by the KY and the Kabaka's Government to oppose UPC operations in Buganda Region after Independence were rejected on the ground that the Party could not allow any outside body to determine where the Party should operate or should not do so.

Then there were demands which are commonly known in Uganda as "our things", which included a range of subjects in the 1962 Constitution which Mengo (Kabaka's Government) and the Mengo Lukiiko wanted to be transferred to the Kabaka's Government as their "things", merely because Buganda was in a special position and KY was in alliance with UPC; but not because there were provisions of the Constitution for doing so. These demands were rejected by the UPC Government. Some of the subjects went to the Courts up to the Privy Council, where Mengo lost. Once more you see in these matters the constant concern of the UPC not only to abide by the constitutional provisions, but also to expose any myth that might have been existing in the minds of citizens or others, be they friends or detractors. The rejection by the UPC Government of a series of demands by Mengo in 1963 and 1964 exposed the myth that any time Mengo wanted anything the Government of Uganda had to comply, or that even today the Government of Uganda has to frame policies covering the welfare of the citizens of Uganda on the basis of the situation in Buganda Region.

Perhaps the most illustrative case in which the myth nearly came to reality was in 1965 and early 1966, when Sir Edward Mutesa, in his double capacity as President and Kabaka, sought to combine the two offices as being one and the same and pretended that both were executive. The details of this attempt will be described later in this letter. But it is clear that when we took action against Mengo and Sir Edward in 1966, the myth that every Mu-ganda, or at least the majority of them, would die in battle for the Kabaka, was fully exposed not only to the people of this country but to the whole world. We have had two years without a Kabaka at Mengo and we have not had a "Biafran" situation. The District Administrations we have created in Buganda Region are becoming very popular with the people in the Region and the talk of continuation of Kabakaship, as far as Government is aware, is confined to a tiny proportion of the people in the Region. On this point, and insofar as the people outside Uganda are concerned, the myth is no longer one of every Muganda dying for the Kabaka, but how mysteriously and mythically Sir Edward escaped alive when "Obote's army stormed his Palace" in 1966.

Everything I have written so far shows that myths in Uganda have been exposed not by prophecy but by events and actions. As regards the myth that Sir Edward mythically and miraculously escaped when the Army stormed his Palace in what the Press has described as "The Battle of Mengo Hill", the elements of myth are in the words "stormed" and "battle". The decision to send a Unit of the Army (40 men, including Officers) to Mengo (Lubiri) was taken by the Cabinet at about 9.00 p.m. on 23rd May, 1966. The day had been a bad one. We had ordered for the arrests of three Saza Chiefs and three other persons. These people were arrested for the part they played in a resolution passed by the Mengo Lukiiko ordering the Government of Uganda to remove itself from the soil of Buganda by 30th May, 1966. The idea was to prosecute them not because of what was said in the Lukiiko, but because of untoward activities undertaken by them before the debate on the motion in the Lukiiko. Immediately they were arrested nearly every part of Buganda Region was in a state of disturbance. Roads were blocked; bridges destroyed; Police stations were attacked — some burnt out with Policemen inside — and at some of these stations chiefs and mobs took possession of Police firearms. White men became a particular target. Some were badly beaten, but only two died. A number have been permanently maimed. Action on expatriates could not be explained at the time, but now we know that it was ordered from Mengo because Sir Edward was rather annoyed that his request to the British Government through the High Commissioner in Kampala for military assistance in the month of February, 1966, was not acted upon by Her Majesty's Government. Harbouring this as a cause against the British, a plan was made by him and his advisors at Mengo that at some suitable moment action against the UPC Government would include action against the British citizens in Uganda. It was their hope, according to the documents we have, that serious action against the British in Uganda would force the British Government to send British troops to Uganda for the purposes of protecting British interests and nationals.

On the same day, 23rd May, a number of ex-Servicemen (Baganda) who were roaming around Kampala since February 1966, shot at an Army lorry which was taking supplies to the Presidential Lodge at Makindye near Kampala. Makindye is where Sir Edward Mutesa was staying as from October 1965 to the middle of March, 1966. He had requested for a Platoon of the Army to be at Makindye, and the Platoon was being supplied regularly with essentials. The Army lorry which was taking to the Platoon essential supplies on 23rd May was attacked by ex-Servicemen using modern weapons. When you are next in Kampala it might be possible to arrange for you to see the Police record of hour to hour information on lawlessness which had broken out in various parts of Buganda Region on that day. It was in these circumstances that a special meeting of the Cabinet was called to consider the situation which was developing.

The decision to declare a State of Emergency in Buganda was not taken until a report, was received at about 8.30 p.m. to the effect that some of the ex-Servicemen who had attacked the Army lorry had been arrested by the Police and had in their possession modern weapons which they alleged were distributed to them by officials at the Lubiri (Mengo) Kabaka's Palace. There was also another information at about 9.00 p.m. to the effect that a number of Police stations had been over-run by mobs led by chiefs, and that some of them had been burnt out. These were some of the considerations that led to the declaration of the State of Emergency in Buganda Region.

After the Cabinet decision I had a meeting both with the Army Commander and the Inspector-General of Police. The two officers were most emphatic that in the then prevailing situation I should give orders for a Unit of the Army to go to Mengo to investigate the story which the Police had obtained from the ex-Servicemen. I agreed with their professional advice and I directed the Army Commander to send a Unit (not the Police as alleged by the Press and Sir Edward) and I also directed the Army Commander to order the Unit to comply with the direction which I must now frame as good behaviour, and the use of minimum force to gain entrance into the Lubiri (Palace) for the purposes of investigating stores of arms. I directed the Army Commander specifically against an Army attack (storming) of the Palace and that special care should be taken not to harm Sir Edward, whom I thought was in the Palace. The Army Commander sent 40 men, including Officers.

The Unit, according to the orders and directives given to them, deposited themselves outside the Palace for ten hours. Those inside the Palace, who were equally armed and in numbers stronger than the Army Unit, thought it was a battle and went on shooting at the gates, but the Army Unit kept themselves out until about 4.00 p.m. in the afternoon of the 24th May, when they gained entrance...
into the Palace. You will find from the book "The Desecration of My Kingdom" by Sir Edward Mutesa, something to the effect that a number of women and children were in the Palace. These were still there when the Army entered the Palace and each one of them is still very much alive. When you come to Uganda it might be possible for you to observe for yourself how impossible it was for 40 men to surround completely the Palace at Mengo. Sir Edward got out when it was raining, at about 1.00 p.m. through the Gate of Death, and went to — of all places — the Roman Catholic Headquarters at Rubaga. From there he moved to a house only two miles away and spent the night. At dawn he was driven in a car through the countryside and spent another night with a friend — still in Buganda Region. The next night he drove to Masaka town, then on to the Tanzania border, where he boarded a boat and went to Bukoba and stayed with a Presbyterian Bishop, before proceeding to Burundi. There is no truth, only myth, in the story that he went through jungles, ate fruits and generally made it to Burundi on foot. That, however, is the myth that a number of papers still entertain.

To consider any policy of the Government of Uganda or reducing that policy to mean that Mengo must approve of it for it to succeed, is to ignore deliberately a number of what I have called landmarks which have taken place in Uganda since Independence Day and which were either favoured or seriously opposed by Mengo. The attempt to ignore those landmarks is the same as living in a world of myth rather than of realities.

I believe that the UPC has now done enough to show that no part of the country is in a position to hold others at ransom. "Somehow, however, two new myths which are contradictory are being advanced both by friends and detractors to the effect that the Government of Uganda is a one-man Government, and secondly that it is a Government not of one man but of the Northerners (Nilotics), which Government, according to our detractors, is resented by the Bantu. The reality of the situation on both counts is that the Government of Uganda is neither a one-man Government nor a Government dominated by the Northerners. There are five Cabinet Ministers from the North in the Government, and the full composition of the Cabinet is twenty. I There are six Permanent Secretaries from the North and the full composition of office of Permanent Secretary is twenty-five. There are three Heads of Departments from the North and we have about forty Departments. I realize, of course, that the offices of President, Commander of the Armed Forces and Chief of Police are held by Northerners, but I do not see any substantial difference between the present and what was obtaining before the Revolution of 1966. The Office of President was then held by Sir Edward (Bantu) without executive powers and I, as Prime Minister then, exercised the same executive powers I now exercise. The Chief of Police today is the same man who was the Chief of Police when Sir Edward was President. The Minister of Defence of today is the same man who was Minister of Defence before the Revolution. The present Commander of the Armed Forces was Deputy to the Commander before the Revolution. He is, perhaps, the cause of the alleged Northern domination of Uganda, because all the others were there before the Revolution. Later in this letter I will question whether an Army which behaves constitutionally is to be regarded as an element of domination. My question will be in the form of explaining to you why and how the Uganda Army got into a position of being discredited. They were discredited because they refused to obey unconstitutional orders and their refusal had nothing to do with any idea of assisting me or a group of Northerners to dominate the politics of Uganda or to make Uganda a domain of the Nilotics.

Those who advance this view of Nilotic domination of Uganda have, at times, shown not only ignorance but also lack of seriousness and integrity in what they say. Some of them have written in reputable newspapers asserting that Uganda is ruled by the 'Os' and that the 'Os' are Lwos of Uganda. The same writers, therefore, attempted to connect the 'Os' of Uganda with the 'Os' of Kenya. The degree of ignorance and the ease of employing myths rather than realities is illustrated by the fact that at a conference last year, even Professor Ali Mazrui included Sam Odaka, the Foreign Minister, as a Lwo merely because his name starts with an O. And yet Odaka is very much a Bantu. The same degree of ignorance was brought up again in the "Sunday Nation", a paper published in Nairobi where both Odaka and Onama were represented as Lwos, while neither of them is a Lwo.

With the five Northern Ministers and the high-ranking Northern officials I have mentioned above, the composition of the Government of Uganda in 1968 is very much the same as it was before the Revolution of 1966. To say that it is I alone who rules Uganda is to expose ignorance of the provisions of the Uganda Constitution. Equally, to represent that the Northerners dominate the Government Public Service, is to say something which does not correspond to facts, or alternatively to assert that they should not be there at all. That alternative would be the only way to prove that Uganda's Public Service is not dominated by the Northerners. Northern domination of Uganda is a myth. In the same way, I say with equal emphasis that the Government of Uganda is civilian and that any suggestion that the Government is being directed by the Army or the Police, to do this or the other, is another myth.

There has been a lot of writing in various newspapers in East Africa, Britain and the U.S.A. that we managed to reduce or destroy Bugandism by using the Army and the Police. The first thing to be considered in analysing that kind of representation is to compare what we did in 1966 with, for example, what President Kennedy did in Alabama against Governor George Wallace. The principle is the same and it is one of whether a national Security Force should be used to preserve law and order and whether the Chief Executive is not the one to take the decision. Could it really be considered overseas that Uganda's Chief Executive (Prime Minister) had no right to order a unit of the Security Forces to preserve law and order? I might as well ask in the same context whether those who said so expected me, my Ministerial colleagues, and, perhaps, Party members, somehow to arm ourselves with rifles to go and fight Mutesa and his group! I would think that the result would have been the same. It would have been represented by our detractors that the Security Forces — the Army and the Police — refused to obey our orders and that we had to take the law into our hands and start a personal fight with the Mengo clique. President Johnson has been sending troops to Vietnam. He also sent troops to Michigan when there were troubles in that State. He has done both in his capacity as the Chief Executive. In our case it has been represented that it was wrong for the Chief executive to send troops or to alert the Police when we had troubles. That, of course, is the contradiction, the logic of which is barren but whose cause appears to be that our detractors do not want certain African Governments to maintain law and order; and when such Governments maintain law and order, they are subjected to kinds of misrepresentation.
I believe I have indicated sufficiently that myth has been the basis of judgment of Uganda's affairs by tie outside world, particularly the West. This conclusion did not dawn on us yesterday. We have been aware of it for some time. The arrest of Nekony and Mayanja, for instance, is being seen in London, and perhaps elsewhere, within the context of the myth that has been the fundamental element in London's assessment of our policy and actions. It is, for instance, being reported that we are afraid of intellectuals and that we do not want our policies and actions to be criticised. I want to say both as an individual and leader of Government, that the Government of Uganda is not opposed to criticisms of its policies and actions. For the last 6£ years the Government has shown abundantly clear the operations of its policy to allow for maximum discussion of the affairs of the Government, both in print and by word of mouth. From time to time Ministers and I have expressed disagreement, at times heatedly, with various statements which have been advanced and made about Uganda.

During the State of Emergency in Buganda Region, we did not consider it fitting to order Press censorship. When we proposed the new Constitution in June, 1967, three months passed before the Constitutional Proposals were adopted and during that period, the Proposals were analysed, criticised and even condemned and not one person was arrested or detained because of views expressed on the Constitutional Proposals.

It is true that during the discussion of the Constitutional Proposals, I had to dismiss one Minister. I took this action not because he had criticised the Proposals; but because as member of the Cabinet, we all spent about nine months in framing the Proposals. At every stage the full Cabinet, without a single dissenting voice, agreed to every single Proposal. That is why the Proposals themselves were published with the title — "The * Government Proposals for a New Constitution". During the framing of the Proposals, there was no reason why the same man as a member of the Cabinet, should not have expressed his disapproval of the Proposals either as whole or part of them. This he did not do, but chose to air contrary views to those which he expressed in Cabinet when he spoke in the National Assembly. You will observe that this kind of behaviour by Ministers was a very strong element in the events which preceded the Revolution and particularly the event of 4th February, 1966. I was not prepared to allow the country in 1967 to go back to the pre-Revolution days when it became a tendency for Ministers, after having agreed in Cabinet on a particular stand, to turn round and act differently in public. Indeed, failure to act immediately when this tendency started might be said to have contributed greatly and indirectly to the Revolution of 1966.

Having dismissed the Minister, the Party Executive also dismissed him from the Party. He was the only person who, during the whole period of discussion of the Constitutional Proposals, had any action taken against him by me as leader of Government and by the Party Executive Committee. I should add that the Party Executive Committee decided on his dismissal from the Party mainly on the same grounds as I had dismissed the man from the Cabinet. The Party Executive Committee had, however, an additional reason — namely that the man was the Leader of the House and in that position he was the Chairman, appointed by me, of the Government Parliamentary Group. The Group discussed the Proposals for days and the Chairman was one of the Ministers who defended specific proposals in Group meetings. The Back-benchers, in particular, were very much annoyed that a person who had defended certain Proposals, indeed supported all the Proposals in meetings of the Government Parliamentary Group, should have changed so violently as to express in the House the opposite views; this behaviour was reported by the Chief Whip to the Party Executive.

There were two other persons who were Members of the Cabinet (Nekony and Binaisa) and who resigned before the Proposals were published. Neither of them informed me in his letter of resignation that he was resigning because of the Constitutional Proposals as a whole or any part of the Proposals. It is still a Cabinet secret but records are available of the strong position each of these two took, when they were still in Cabinet, regarding the Constitutional Proposals. The items of the proposals agreed to by the Cabinet when both were still members of the Cabinet were not changed after they left. It is not for me to discuss herein how a man would say one thing today and say the exact opposite tomorrow, but the history of Uganda, when it comes to be written in full, will tell the whole story.

A considerable number of Back-benchers, particularly in the Parliamentary Group meetings and even in the National Assembly, spoke strongly against certain provisions, but none of them was either disciplined by the Party or considered to be a disloyal member of the Party. Even civil servants, who discussed the Proposals with me, expressed various views in opposition to some of the Proposals, and again, none of them was victimised for having done so. I know of no person in Uganda who has been arrested or victimised because of criticising the Government or because of having written something (not otherwise openly criminal) during the state of emergency. We have had only one person prosecuted for publishing a seditious article and the person was tried and convicted — not detained under Emergency Regulations.

As regards "Transition" the first thing that can be said is that we have known of its existence throughout all these years. The magazine published articles and letters on the Constitution, and most of them were highly critical. If we had wanted to take action against "Transition" or its Editor because of anything published, we would not have done so at this stage. Action should have been taken some time back. You must have read an article by Abu Mayanja published in "Transition" No. 32. That article was not only critical but included a deliberate misquotation on an important item in the Constitutional Proposals. That is, for instance, that part of the article reading as follows: "The Proposals expressly provide (Article 64) that "in the performance of any function conferred upon him by this Constitution or any other law, the President shall act in his own discretion and shall not be obliged to follow the advice tendered by any other person or authority". In this passage Mayanja sought to quote directly from the Constitutional Proposals; but the quotation published omitted a vital part of the section. This was the omission of the words "unless it is otherwise provided" which occurs between the words "shall" and "act". It was on that false basis that Mayanja's article was framed, and carried the meaning that the Proposals gave to the President alone the full executive powers and that the President was not to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution but only on his own discretion. If the words which were omitted are included, the Article would have given a contrary meaning, namely that the President was to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and that only where the Constitution is silent, he had to act on his own discretion.

In view of the overwhelming publicity that has been given to the allegation that I or the Government proposed a curious Constitution which gave power to one man alone, and knowing that this is not the case, we could have taken some action against
There is another incident and this is contained in "Transition" No. 37, and in a passage reading as follows: "I do not believe the rumour circulating in legal circles for the past year or so that the Judicial Service Commission had made a number of recommendations in this direction, but that the appointments have for one reason or another, mostly tribal considerations, not been confirmed. But what is holding up the appointment of Ugandan Africans to the High Court?" The allegation here is that the Judicial Service Commission which, according to the Constitution, is the only body which advises the President on the appointment of High Court Judges, has in fact recommended Ugandan Africans for appointment as Judges and that the President who makes the appointments has not done so for one reason or another mostly tribal considerations. I am advised that it is immaterial to say that the writer and the publisher did not believe in the rumour. The fact which I can disclose to you is that the Judicial Service Commission has made no recommendations for the appointment of Africans to the office of Judge of the High Court. What disturbs me about this passage is that in "Transition" No. 32, the attack was that it is the President alone who has the power to make these appointments, in his own discretion without the advice of any person or authority. In "Transition" No. 37, the attack has been advanced to the effect that even after he had been advised, the President is failing to act constitutionally mostly on tribal considerations.

It would appear that most people who have reacted on the arrest and detention of Neogy and Mayanja, though aware of these writings against Uganda, do also hold the view that it is not a bad thing to run the Government down, or to accuse it of what it has not done and generally make the world believe that Uganda is a country where life and property are not safe.

There is one other incident regarding the printed matter which occurred in early 1966. This is the deportation of (he former Uganda correspondent of the "Kenya Weekly News", Mr. Ted Jones. The history of the incident starts in June 1965. I was away from the country from May 9th to August 7th, 1965. During that period a number of Party colleagues, including Government Ministers, attempted to reactivate the UPC/KY alliance. "The Reporter", a magazine published in Kenya, came out during the period with the story that some Ministers were making arrangements to remove me not only from the leadership of the Government but also of the Party. There was, however, some evidence of this and the story in "The Reporter", which was written by Mr. Jones, was not far from the truth. This attempt to reactivate the alliance failed because UPC Members of Parliament, the Backbenchers, and the Party as a whole could not be persuaded to accept such a move.

In the month of September of that year I discussed at a secret meeting of the Party Executive Committee my then intention to advise the President to dissolve the National Assembly and the holding of a General Election early in 1966. This information did not please some members of the Executive Committee, including the then Secretary-General, and it was immediately leaked to the Press. The purpose of the leakage appears to have been one of removing the element of surprise in calling a General Election and of showing to the KY group that unless they joined the UPC immediately, a General Election was going to be held and as things stood then the DP was not going to be a match for the UPC, but that the result of the elections would then be one of UPC in a commanding position in the three Regions, with KY, that is virtually the whole of Buganda, with 21 seats, being in Opposition. This state of affairs, the re-activists argued, would work against the re-election of the then President. Indeed, this kind of consideration had already been advanced to the KY group in July, 1965, and the then President himself chaired a meeting of the KY group at which meeting it was decided that KY members should join the UPC in large numbers and thereby use their influence not only to change the UPC policy but also its leadership.

In the first week of October 1965 we had another meeting of the Party Executive Committee where a proposal was put that members of the Party's National Council from Buganda Region should be increased from three to eighteen. The National Council, according to the then Party Constitution, was composed of Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer from each Region. "Region" in the then UPC Constitution meant an administrative district recognised in the Constitution of Uganda, and the Party regarded Kampala as a special Region. Since Buganda was centrally administered, the UPC considered Buganda, excepting Kampala, as one unit, and all other districts were equally considered as distinctive units sending three representatives to the Party's National Council. The full composition of the National Council included members of the Party's Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee was composed of officials of the Party, namely, President, Vice-President, Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General, Treasurer, Assistant Treasurer, Chairman and Deputy Chairman, together with twelve elected representatives.

In my absence between May and August the Executive met to consider the proposal to increase Buganda's membership of the National Council and rejected it. The same matter was again brought in October, when it was once more rejected. The idea of increasing Buganda's membership of the National Council was not so much as to give a unit of some two million people fair representation — in any case the UPC's share of that population was not very big — but it was one of getting into the National Council persons who were KY in spirit and UPC in body, for the purposes of changing the Party policy and leadership. When this proposal was rejected in October a new development which reached its height in February 1966 and which was the basic reason for the deportation of Mr. Jones began to emerge.

It was on the 7th October, 1965, when five incidents occurred, and whether they constituted a coincidence or not at that time, they have now been proved not to be matter of coincidence. On that day I received a letter from Mengo informing me that a group of left-wingers (Communists) were intending to overthrow the Government of Uganda and the Kabaka's Government on or about the 9th October (Independence Anniversary) 1965. The letter requested me to issue a statement condemning any such plot and that I state my position. The second incident was a letter written to the Minister of Internal Affairs by the late Daudi Ochang. with a copy to me, saying that the Minister should send a senior Police Officer to take a statement from an unnamed person regarding the activities of an
Army Officer, Idi Amin. The author of the letter added that it was his expectation that, on taking the statement, Government would immediately suspend Idi Amin.

Again, on the same day, at the end of a Cabinet Meeting, I heard Grace Ibingira saying that he had discovered a plot to assassinate him during the Independence Anniversary celebrations. He was addressing no particular Minister and added that others would be equally assassinated. This was such a serious statement that I immediately ordered him and the Minister of Internal Affairs to remain behind, and called the Inspector-General of Police so that we could go through the allegations. This we did from midnight for two hours and arrangements were made by the Police that very night to get onto the persons who were alleged to be plotting to assassinate Ibingira. The Police did not find any evidence to establish the allegation.

The fourth matter was a report by the then Commander of the Uganda Army, Shaban Opolot, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, to the effect that Opolot had received information that Baganda were plotting to assassinate him and also that soldiers from the Congo would attack the Headquarters of the Uganda Army during the Independence Anniversary celebrations. This story was fully investigated and the Police found nothing in it.

The fifth incident concerned the activities of a then Major in the Uganda Armed Forces, Katabarwa, brother of Grace Ibingira, who was the Commandant of the Training Wing stationed in Jinja. He came to Kampala on 7th October, 1965, and on return to Jinja contacted a number of officers, including two who were on open charge and therefore not on duty, to draw arms and to report to Brigadier Opolot at Army Headquarters in Kampala. His order was obeyed and seven officers came to Kampala on 8th October heavily armed, and one of them went to a football field with the boot of his car full of various arms. These officers and a few others were stationed in Kampala and virtually took over the control of the Army Headquarters.

All these five incidents happened on the same day—7th October, 1965. They did not end there and during the night of 8th/9th October, Shaban Opolot ordered sections of the Army to move to Kampala. The city became an armed camp and at the Army Headquarters that night officers and other soldiers who for unknown reasons were not informed by Opolot of what was taking place, found themselves virtually prisoners at Army Headquarters.

On 9th October, 1965, after the Trooping of the Colours, there was a party at the Makindye Presidential Lodge. Neither the Minister responsible for Defence nor myself knew that a Company of the Army was to be stationed around the Lodge, and the guests were very much in fear when they saw troops everywhere, fully armed. The next day I raised the whole matter with the then President. I went to inform him of what I had learnt since October 7th, and also to tell him that neither the Minister nor myself knew of the deployment of forces at the Presidential Lodge; but when I raised these matters with the President he merely waved me off and said he was himself going to discuss the matters with Opolot, and added that as Commander-in-Chief he preferred to discuss matters of this kind with the Army Commander rather than with a civilian Prime Minister.

That was the first time a part of the Uganda Army began to be used for political purposes and objectives. The first objective was to fulfill what the UPC could not do, namely, arrange for an affiance between the Party and KY change its policy and leadership. The plotters apparently expected the Army to assist in doing it but the Army did nothing of the kind.

Then in November, 1965, Opolot arranged for two Units of the Army to change Barracks. It was clear to all that the Unit at Jinja, having failed in October to do something unconstitutional, had to be sent into the country and far from the capital. It so happened that according to our regulations a change of Barracks must be notified to the troops six months in advance, and such a change be approved by the Chief Defence Staff Committee, which is composed of senior officers and chaired by the Minister responsible for Defence. The notification for change of Barracks was made on 28th November, 1965, in a secret letter to the Commanders of the two Units, and the change-over was to be completed by the end of December, 1965. The Chief Defence Staff Committee knew nothing about the change, and the Ministry was not informed, although the secret letter was said to have been copied to the Ministry. We now know that on the direct orders of Opolot the copy of the letter which was to go to the Ministry was deliberately not sent. The matter of the change of barracks leaked out and T ordered Opolot to follow proper procedure.

In December, 1965, the then President placed orders for heavy weapons with a Kampala firm. The arms were to come from Britain. We have letters from a British firm which show that the firm was not happy with the orders on the grounds that the weapons ordered were too heavy for an individual and that the firm had always dealt with Governments only. One of the letters from the Kampala firm states that President Mutesa had placed the orders on behalf of the Uganda Army and that although the Kabaka's Government was to pay for the arms, that only meant that the President, in his capacity as the Kabaka, was to have the first right to fulfill what the UPC could not do. namely, arrange for an affiance between the Party and KY change its policy and leadership. The plotters apparently expected the Army to assist in doing it but the Army did nothing of the kind.

That was the situation which had developed as we entered into 1966. Ted Jones must have known of some aspects of the situation.

Then February 1966 came and the Parliamentary debate on the 4th of that month was designed to make it easy for a change of Government. I had planned in November of the previous year a tour of the Northern Region in January or February of 1966. The date of the tour was Anally fixed in January and a statement from my office was issued, published in the Press and broadcast on the radio. You will find from Sir Edward Mutesa's book "The Desecration of my Kingdom" a statement to the effect that I mysteriously disappeared. It is also true that on 31st January I attended a meeting of the Party's Parliamentary Group, at which meeting I specifically asked the Group whether I should postpone my tour, and the meeting unanimously rejected any idea of postponement of the tour. When I left Entebbe on 1st January further attempts were made to reactivate the activities of October, 1965. Those who were in the plot decided on supporting and using the Opposition motion to achieve their aims but saw a number of obstacles. One obstacle was whether or not the Backbenchers would fall into their line. This was resolved by putting that Motion on the order paper on a Friday and in the expectation that after about 4 p.m. Government Backbenchers from up-country would have left the House to return to their constituencies. The Government Parliamentary Group had considered the motion at their meeting of 31st January, 1966, and resolved to reject it. The other obstacle was that the House would rise on that day at 6.30 p.m. and since the House was due to meet in the following week, there was not sufficient time to debate their Motion and bring it to a conclusion on the Friday, and that it would continue the following Monday. The possibility of the Motion being on the order paper the following Monday was a disturbing factor,
but they found a way of resolving the difficulty. This was done through a Motion to the effect that the House had to sit that Friday until business on the order paper had been completed, and that at the end of the sitting the House was to adjourn indefinitely. Then pressure was put on two Members to withdraw their Motions which were higher on the order paper than the Opposition Motion. These arrangements made it possible for the House to reach the Opposition Motion and to debate it until about 9 p.m. when the House then adjourned indefinitely. The scheme was to deny me, and other members who were absent, opportunity to speak on the debate and, although that happened, those who were in the plot were not sure of themselves and soon found out that the passing of the Motion could not help them to achieve their aims.

They again went to the Army, and troops were moved to Kampala that very night. Troops continued to come to Kampala up to the afternoon of 7th February, 1966. OQ that day a Unit was ordered to start shelling Kampala and it disobeyed the order. When another Unit was ordered to shell Parliament Building, it again refused to do so. This stand by the troops caused a great deal of panic amongst the plotters. They discussed the issues and they decided upon two courses of action. One was to send a Platoon to where I was in the Northern Region, with orders to arrest and bring me back dead or alive. This Platoon went, their leaders were received by me, but it did not succeed in its mission. Its two officers knew of the mission, but the soldiers were not told. When the Platoon arrived at where I was, it found itself unable to carry out its mission. It returned to Kampala empty-handed, arriving in the morning hours of 8th February.

The second action had therefore to be carried out, and this was the decision to request the British High Commissioner for military assistance, which was made in the afternoon of 8th February. This again did not succeed, and when I returned on 12th February, I immediately came to realise that the situation was very serious. The first action I took was to direct Opolot to order all Units of the Army to return to their Barracks. This was achieved in the afternoon of Sunday, 13th February. On the same day I wrote to the President informing him of what I had learnt and requested a meeting with him. I got no reaction from the President. Next day I telephoned his office, or rather where he was staying, and spoke to his Private Secretary to whom I gave a message that I wanted to see the President immediately, I was told that the President had gone to Masaka, but the fact is that he was a few steps from his secretary who was speaking to me on the telephone.

Then I called a Cabinet Meeting on 14th February, and I put two points to the Cabinet. The first was that any Minister who had lost confidence in me and believed in all that was said in the Parliamentary debate on Friday, 4th February, should indicate so by the process of resignation. Not one gave any such indication. The second proposal I put to the Cabinet was that I had resolved on the appointment of a Judicial Commission to investigate the allegations which were advanced in the Parliamentary debate. You will find again in "The Desecration of My Kingdom," a statement to the effect that it was the Cabinet that forced me on this second course of action. The records of the Cabinet show very clearly that those Ministers who sought to achieve their objectives on 4th February, did not like the appointment of a Judicial Commission of Inquiry. They wanted a limited action on the suspension of Idi Amin. Apparently they felt that with Amin out, Opolot would use the Army to achieve unconstitutional ends. I was not prepared to accept any limited action and in two further meetings these two views were very clear, but at the end my proposal for a Judicial Commission of Inquiry was accepted.

I then left for Nairobi on 17th February, but on return on the 19th I came to learn of a circular by Opolot to all Army Units directing them to go for field exercises with dud weapons, and giving the date of the exercise as the third week of the same February. The curious thing about this order is that Opolot actually stated that because the situation had been normal throughout February 1966, and because for some period of months the Army had not done field exercises, February 1966 was the most suitable time for these exercises. I ordered the cancellation of the exercises. The important point to note here is that those who made the allegations against me and the two other Ministers and Idi Amin on 4th February, 1966, did not want the allegations to be inquired into by an impartial body and wanted, so to speak, to jump the gun by once more attempting to effect a change of Government by using the Army. I had, therefore, to take drastic action.

All these events and happenings could not have been completely hidden from Ted Jones, but both in the "Kenya Weekly News" and "The Reporter" he advanced the theory that troops moved into Kampala by Opolot were for the purpose of safeguarding the Constitution. Evidence, even that part of it which was known to the general public in Kampala, pointed otherwise. This led us to think that Ted Jones was more than a sympathiser of the plotters. He had, therefore, to be deported. That was the first writer against whom we took action during our troubles which started in 1966.

I would now like to turn to the present situation in Uganda. Here I would reveal that I do not bet, nor do I swear, but the allegations and awkward innuendoes printed in your newspaper on 27th October, 1968, which as you must have assessed were all against me and the Government of Uganda, will be proved or disproved by the passing of time. I would like to begin with that edition of your newspaper. It was the belief of your correspondent that the recent arrests in Uganda may “indicate that I feel less secure than I claim”. I have made no claims either publicly or privately to anybody, that I am secure or less secure, but if your newspaper or any other would like to interpret every action taken by any African leader in terms of his personal security, the paper cannot be any different from a number of publications which are always deadly against African Governments, and only support the Governments when leaders of those Governments do something which pleases not the citizens of a country of Africa, but foreign interests. That your newspaper should sink so low as to expose itself to the shallow logic that the Uganda Government, in taking action against certain persons, represents that the leaders of that Government are necessarily less secure than they claim, is to say that T and the Government of Uganda are not interested in integrity of Uganda or its security, but only in our own positions, it would follow, therefore, and this is indicated in the rest of the article, that the Government of Uganda is an alien body composed of self-seekers who do not take the interests of Uganda seriously and only act for their own self-interests. I do not need to say more on this matter, but I have taken the point.

Then there was the other point in your newspaper that those recently arrested must have been arrested because another paper published in Uganda has been "conducting a debate in its columns on the legality of Obote's rule," with one of the arrested persons playing the prosecutor’s role. I have had occasion since you wrote to me to look through the columns of this other paper and I have not
found this debate on the legality of Obote's Government. It is true that there was a letter in that paper written by one of the recently arrested persons on the Constitutional Proposals, but there is nowhere in that letter anything questioning the legality of the Government of Uganda. All the correspondent's views were based on what he saw as shortcomings in the Constitutional Proposals. If "Shortcomings" means the same thing as "legality" or "legitimacy" in the editorial office of your newspaper, there is nothing that the Government of Uganda can do about it. We have got to accept that situation. Again, if one letter in a newspaper by anybody at all amounts to the writer of the letter conducting a debate as a prosecutor, it is something which only your newspaper must understand. The issue is that your newspaper was seriously suggesting that the Editor of the Uganda paper and the correspondent do not accept the Republic Constitution. I am grateful for that revelation for it shows the falsehood of the two men to what they profess to be.

Your newspaper and a Uganda paper went on to say "that the debate and criticism from Makerere have been of a fairly rarefied academic nature and are less of a threat than certain wider political-and military discontents." In the first place we know of no criticism from Makerere. I should be grateful if you would arrange for me to receive notice of where such criticism was published, but if it is personal expressions of lecturers at Makerere to your correspondent, it is certainly bad journalism to put that to the world in a manner that would indicate that there were certainly criticisms from Makerere. Even it is accepted that there has been criticism of Government from Makerere, where is the evidence for the assertion that any such criticism was merely academic and cannot be compared with criticisms of discontent emanating from political and military sources?

The issue of discontent from military sources is not a new thing to us. "Africa Confidential" last year came out with a story that I had a private army; that I was planning to remove the Commander of the Uganda Army and appoint in his place an Army officer from my own tribe; and that anything was likely to happen within Uganda in the near future. The story was read in Uganda with appropriate interpretation. The officer who was said to be a member of my tribe and who was going to be appointed Chief of the Army was known by everybody in Uganda and was, of course, not from my tribe. The private army was something which existed in the editorial offices of "Africa Confidential". This is the same story which we had from the British press towards the end of 1965 and the beginning of 1966, when those who pretended to understand the state of affairs in Uganda went out to tell the world, in print, that in the political crisis in Uganda between the Northerners and the Bantu, the Army stood aside because the Army was controlled not by the quarrelling parties but by the half-Hamites. When we took action, as I have described above, the story changed to one of the Northerners being in control of the Army, and this is the same story as was published in your newspaper of 27th October, 1968, where it was stated that the Baganda, or Bantu, resent Northern domination. As to how an Army which was controlled by half-Hamites changed overnight to being controlled by Northerners, was never explained by experts who write in the British press.

Then there comes the "Africa Confidential" story of a division within the Northern group and with myself becoming more and more like what happened to my friend Kwame Nkrumah, in his last days, drawing to an inner circle of tribesmen. And yet, as everyone who wants to assess the position will find out, the number of my tribesmen in the Police and in the Army is negligible. They do not form a Company in the Army and they are too few in the Police — so much so that Parliamentarians have sometimes asserted that they are not there at all. Although they are Northerners and it is true that both in the Police and in the Army the Northerners are there in considerable numbers — my tribesmen are not in either organisation in a number which would indicate strength.

As regards the position of the Uganda Army, I am perhaps the only African leader who is not afraid of a military take-over. I have already publicly accused and condemned military leaders as General Ankrah, Major Afrifa and the late General Ironsi for using national guns — not their own property — in order to place themselves in positions of authority and pretend to rule the country on the false propaganda of being the "saviour" of their various countries. I do not accept the soldier-saviour who misuses, unconstitutionally, national weapons in order to place himself in the job of a politician. I treat that kind of exercise and action, to say it mildly, as corruption. I have read with amusement various press reports on how military regimes have stopped other forms of corruption in some African countries. My view of all this kind of report is that the whole thing is bad. If a politician like Nkrumah or Nyerere or Kenyatta, who saw the possibilities of Africans being free in their own countries: worked for it, suffered, made sacrifices, and succeeded at least initially in realising their vision, turn out to be Heads of corrupt Governments, how much so would a military man, who never went through those processes of imagination, formulation of policies, arousing of the interest of the people towards the goal of independence, be when that soldier becomes the boss of the country? The immediate thing to realise is that the soldier, if he was a true soldier all the time, did not know of the battles which were being fought, the issues at stake, the glory above the conquest of lowering the colonial flag, and it is my view that the military man will preside over a more corrupt State than the politician. If corruption is the issue for deposing an illustrious leader like Nkrumah, then the answer cannot be found in replacing him with General Ankrah. If it is my view that there must have been more corruption in Ghana during the time of General Ankrah than there was in the time of Kwame Nkrumah.

I am, therefore, not afraid of military takeover in Africa. Indeed, at some awkward times I entertained the idea that the armies of African countries should take over all the governments in Africa. We would then see how they would organise the O.A.U., what their policies would be towards problems like Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. The people of Africa would see what becomes of them in the West/East conflict; and every citizen of Africa in his own home and in every State would be able to assess what the politicians promised and achieved on the one hand, and what the military man promised and achieved on the other. I am almost certain that in every country in Africa the citizens would come to realise that the politicians promised more and achieved less; and the military man promised the same things as the politicians and achieved much less than the politicians. To promise more and achieve less is not, in my view, an exceptional phenomenon of politicians in Africa. In practically every country of the world, politicians, being great talkers, always say more than they are able to do. Wilson's electoral slogan of "The Labour Party Works" is an instance in point. It has not worked in the case of Rhodesia; it has not worked on the British economy: and may work, after having failed to work, in two or three years from now. It did not work on the Commonwealth Mission to North Vietnam. It did not work on the policy of joining the European Common Market, people like your correspondent would be advancing theories that it is a Government which may be replaced by the Army any day. But because in the develop countries national image, unity and integrity are considered above every type of squabble, no-one will suggest what actions by the British Government are taken by the whole Cabinet merely to safeguard the position of the Prime Minister. That, however, was the view of your correspondent: namely, that the Uganda Government as a whole
would arrest two persons, with clearly very limited influence in the internal politics of the country, merely to safeguard the position of the President.

As regards the view that I was showing "signs of wanting to be a philosopher President, like Leopold Senghor of Senegal or Julius Nyerere of Tanzania", I have to say that I am a practical and professional politician. My knowledge — and I regret to say this — of President Leopold Senghor is limited, but I know President Julius Nyerere well. I can say that I have learnt from the latter, and hope to continue to learn from him. After all, he is older than myself and his country achieved independence before mine. In the second place he built a strong party, which is the only party in mainland Tanzania and much as writers on Africa should by now know that we in Africa are learning from one another, there appears to be considerable objection even by your newspaper, to Uganda being a one-party State. Up to now I have not seen one view in your newspaper condemning the one-party State of mainland Tanzania. These differences of newspaper views on African countries we understand perhaps much more than you people who write them. Maybe we put the wrong interpretation, but I think in the final analysis our views are correct. If it is the concern of the British press or the Western press that it is wrong for a country in Africa to be a one-party State and if that is a matter of principle, how come that principle does not apply in the case of Tanzania, but must apply in the case of Uganda or Ghana?

In the case of Uganda, if we move the Tanzania way of a one-party State and adopt a policy of socialism and self-reliance, we will certainly be condemned in London; we will be condemned by the whole British press and in the whole of the Western world. On the other hand, even if we write word for word Kenya's sessional paper on African Socialism, striking off Kenya and putting Uganda instead, we will again be condemned in London and throughout the Western world. That is the essence of your correspondent's article in your newspaper of 27th October, 1968. It was the article which said, in effect, that I, as President of Uganda, and my Ministers, are self-seekers who want to use our Party, the UPC, to assist us in our personal interests, and that should we move the Tanzania way our self-seeking characteristics will be the motive power, and should we remain where we are or move towards the Kenya set-up, again our personal interests would be the guiding factor.

The question of stable society in every State in Africa, to be frank with you, is looked at by correspondents of British newspapers in Africa from a very narrow angle and the question, though fundamental, is varied from country to country, depending on the country they are discussing. There is no overall policy by any of the British newspapers in the context of African problems. This includes your newspaper. I would rather prefer papers like "The Telegraph" which are wholly opposed to Africans except when they are traitors to Africa. Your newspaper pretends not to have a policy of the type of "The Telegraph", but time and again falls into line with "The Telegraph". It is fair in a battle to know the enemy and throughout the centuries victors have always respected the conquered, but no-one has ever given any degree of respect to a traitor and a hypocrite.

I have no intention of being a philosopher. I respect both Senghor and Nyerere. They have solved lots of problems. I have also tried to do the same, but with your newspaper, however, the matters are personal. It is Obote who is insecure. It is he who does not want criticism from intellectuals, whatever that might mean. It is Buganda that has refused to accept the new Constitution, because of Obote and his Northerners. This kind of reasoning suggests that only the Northerners believe in Republicanism. What about your correspondent's article in its wider implication to African States? Remove Uganda. Obote and Makerere, and make a positive attempt to re-write that article in the context of any African country. But the workings of military governments in the West Coast of Africa will somehow fit into (he article. Was this a condemnation of Obote alone, or was it of an African government? And if Obote alone, why? Was it because London would want their man in Entebbe, and that the present man is not theirs? Your newspaper has given us a clue to a number of things which we saw in a hazy manner throughout the Revolution and the State of Emergency in Buganda Region.

As regards the position of your newspaper that the extension of the Emergency in Buganda Region meant that it was for the sole purpose "to push people around" which matter must lead one to "assume that things have not yet settled down in two years since the Revolution in which he dismissed the Kabaka of Buganda from the Presidency of Uganda as a whole," the whole thing is laughable. Let your newspaper bet. I will not bet because it is not one of my pastimes. The real point is why explain actions of a Government in such a simple form? For a reputable newspaper to reduce the actions of a Government in such a propagandistic form is to indicate a bias which undermines that reputation. We can easily do away with the State of Emergency, but when we do so it will not be either because your correspondent, your newspaper or citizens of Uganda who are stooges of foreigners, have said the Emergency must come to an end. Whatever concern your correspondent and your paper as a whole must have had on the administration of the Emergency Regulations, this concern must be balanced by the concern that we, who are responsible for the administration of Uganda, have in the welfare of the people and their stability. To say that because of the freedom of the press or the printed word, the welfare of the press should be paramount to the welfare of the State is to raise a highly debatable point.

What your newspaper was saying in this context was that because the Government of Uganda decided on the detention of two persons, the decision was vindictive and indicative of how shaky the Government is, and that stability in Uganda can only come about if the former President becomes involved in the administration of Uganda.

Your correspondent was recently here in Kampala. He moved freely and all visitors who come to our country have not noticed that we have a State of Emergency. Kampala and other towns are extending, with new buildings coming up, and there is not a single soldier that you will see in the streets of Kampala or any other town, nor a policeman with a gun. Are all these signs of failure? No! Your correspondent was writing politics, and politics of those people who advanced in December, 1964, a million dollars to cause trouble in Uganda. It is possible that I am wrong in this assessment, but I cannot see any other form of explaining this kind of journalism.

A. MILTON OBOTE