

UPC: from independence to the 1966 revolution

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With independence attained, Uganda and UPC were now at a threshold. As Engels once said: "So long as a viable nation is fettered by an alien conqueror it necessarily directs all its efforts, all its aspirations and all its energy against the external enemy; so long as its internal life is paralyzed in this way, it is incapable of fighting for social emancipation." (Engels, F. 1869; also quoted in Brutents, K.N 1977:168) The kind of emancipation Uganda was poised for is national-democratic liberation and UPC was in the saddle to lead this transformation. By national-democratic liberation is meant the changes that not only remove colonial obstacles, but also lay important premises for socio-economic development.....At the beginning the leadership of UPC did not have a clear picture of national-democratic liberation; however, the lack of clarity on national-democratic liberation was not a fatal obstacle. The situation the UPC found itself was somehow similar to what Fredrick Engels noted in his analysis of The Paris Commune when he observed that much as the commune was led by people with the wrong ideology, the commune took a very correct line. "It does the commune the greatest honour that in all its economic measures the 'driving spirit' was not any set of principles but simple, practical needs. And therefore these measures --were not at all in accordance with the spirit of Proudinism, but certainly in accordance with the spirit of German scientific socialism." (Marx, K & Engels, F. 1973: 86; quoted in Brutents, K.N. vol 1977 K.N. 219) It is in this mould that the UPC leadership spearheaded the struggle for national-democratic liberation. Stumbling sometimes; but getting up and finding their way in the struggles.

In his book, "The Buganda factor in Uganda Affairs,"--a book which is seriously anti-UPC and some aspects of which we intend to respond to--Professor Mutibwa titles his first chapter, "Things begin to fall Apart". To a Muganda imbued with the ideology of Buganda being a dominant power, Mutibwa was bound to view the events of the first three years of Uganda's independence as the beginning of things falling apart. There is a sense in which because Buganda was beginning to decline from its previous dominant position, things were beginning to fall apart for it. None other than Kabaka Mutesa himself gave us a glimpse of the feeling: "'My first twinge of foreboding had come at midnight on 9 October, 1962, as I watched Milton Obote raise the flag of independence. My anxiety had no precise form or cause. It was more the sensing of an unfamiliar shift of emphasis, a gap between what was fitting and what was not." (Mutesa, E. 27) On the other hand we in UPC, who felt the need for this Buganda dominance to end, had a totally different view from that of Professor Mutibwa. While Mutibwa sees it as the beginning of things falling apart, we see it as the beginnings of the struggles for national-democratic liberation.

The UPC Youth League:

Dr Obote always referred to the youth as one of the pillars of the Uganda Peoples' Congress. There was/is reason for this. The youth by their very nature are rebellious. They want change. This is a characteristic the youth share with UPC, the party being a liberation movement.

The best account ever of the UPC Youth League was given by Akiiki Mujaju in his PhD thesis. (Mujaju, A.B. 1972) He does summarise: "In general one can look at the relationship between the League and the party in terms of very clearly patterned phases. It is clear that during 1962 and a large part of 1963 the league was loyally abiding by the directions of the party. The period before independence in 1962 was clearly the time when both experienced their closest corporation, so much so that there was hardly any need for a separate organisation. However, after the elections and in particular after independence, when the party leaders took

charge of the direction of an independent state things began to change. Although no open hostility was visible between the two entities, it is clear that some party leaders fell out with the League, and eventually felt the League was sufficiently troublesome to warrant the formulation of a new youth policy that downgraded the League. As this policy of downgrading the League took shape, with the formation of National Union of Youth Organisation, open confrontation started between key leaders of the party and the League members culminating in the expulsion from the party of some these League leaders from the party." (Mujaju, A. 1972: 183) For the full account of the UPC youth league see the extract from the PhD thesis given as an appendix at the end of this book.

Election of Kabaka Mutesa President of Uganda, 1963.

At independence the Queen of England remained the Head of State of Uganda while Obote was the Prime Minister. On the ground she was represented by the Governor-General, Sir Walter Coutts . This arrangement was temporary and on 4 October 1963 an election to elect a replacement took place. Sir Edward Mutesa, Kabaka of Buganda was elected to fill this position.

It had been part of the bargain for the KY/UPC alliance that the Kabaka of Buganda would be Head of State. This was a very suave move. The Baganda of those days could not imagine anybody being in status above their Kabaka. And so by making the Kabaka Head of State their sentiments was very well-taken care of. There is another purpose the Kabaka's election served. Ever since 1949 Buganda had sought to separate itself from the rest of the colony. Among the tasks Sir Andrew Cohen as Governor, came to do was to counter the separatist tendencies of Buganda. It was in the process of handling this that the 1953 crisis erupted. In 1961 Buganda actually filed for separate independence from the rest of the colony. It is the KY/UPC alliance which got Buganda to participate in the election of 1962. making the Kabaka president was getting Buganda to be more involved in the politics of Uganda. The other reason for having the Kabaka become Head of State is what has been well-argued by professor Wright: "What can be the functional equivalents of monarchy in countries like the United States and India which have lost that institution irretrievably? One such (used by the Soviet Union in its constituent republics) is the ceremonial presidency which can be safely bestowed upon some prestigious and cooperative member of the former ruling elite for the vicarious satisfaction of the rest of the group. Indians never tire of pointing to the late President Zakir Husain, Chief Justice Hidayatullah and a covey of state governors from the Muslim minority. These men may be ineffective, or unwilling to be real representatives of their community, but they do seem to lend the state some of the desired legitimacy in the eyes of the minority. They constitute a kind of "tokenism" for the downwardly mobile. If the American presidency had developed in the direction in which it seemed headed under Eisenhower, it might have become a harmless sop of this sort for the Wasps in their decline." (Wright T.P. 1976:61)

How was the Kabaka to become Head of State? An election procedure of some sort was contrived. In this procedure, it was Constitutional Heads who were qualified to contest. The heads of kingdoms and the Kyabazinga of Busoga automatically qualified. In order not to have those districts or nationalities without Constitutional Heads feeling left out, the position of Constitutional Heads of each district was created and filled. Teso District refused to fill its position. With the positions of Constitutional Heads filled, elections were then held. Prior to the elections, the UPC caucus discussed the matter. The majority of UPCs came up in support of their Vice President, William Wilberforce Nadiope, the Kyabazinga of Busoga, leaving their President of the UPC with the Kabaka without support. After a very prolonged deliberations, with Obote threatening to resign as leader, the UPC caucus grudgingly accepted to support Mutesa. Mutesa himself has given us his take of the arduous struggle Obote went through to get him elected President.

"In October I was elected president. Though important in my life and career, this moment was not so

significant as a political straw in the wind as some thought. There were rumours that I must have made secret concessions to Obote over the lost counties, and that the Prime Minister was reversing his anti-Buganda policy, which was by now clear, if not threatening. These held no truth. Sir Walter Coutts had become Governor general after independence, but this was always meant to be a temporary appointment by the national assembly. Indeed a few months before he said to me at a dinner in government house, where the next head of State would live, "And when are you coming here?" Genuinely misunderstanding, I replied, "On Saturday for lunch. Don't you remember?" He probably took this as a diplomatic manoeuvre to avoid answering. After discussions, it had been decided to elect one of the rulers for a five-year term. In that case there was little choice either for Obote or for me. He was not in a position to snub the Buganda, who would have been enraged if any other ruler was chosen, as the new president would have precedence over the Kabaka even in Buganda. Similarly, it was difficult for me to refuse. I was told of the possibility of the election when I was in Ndaiga. The only factor which caused me to hesitate was wondering whether there would be a conflict between my duty as President and my duty as Kabaka. I decided that I could separate the two roles as I could separate my position as Commander-in-chief from the position as colonel in the Grenadiers, to which I had just been promoted. I sent a word to the Katikiro, still Michael Kintu. This illustrates my relationship with the Lukiiko. I would have felt free to refuse without referring to anyone, but I asked for permission to accept. Negotiations were secret as this was merely to allow my name to be put forward, a necessary manoeuvre to avoid the embarrassment of my being elected and then refusing. Kintu sounded public opinion through the chiefs, found it favourable, and I accepted nomination, knowing that in this case I had the full support of the Prime Minister and thus almost certain to be elected. Still there was some comedy before the election. One of the candidates as the Kyabazinga of Busoga was Sir William Wilberforce, known as Uncle Billy, who was also vice President of UPC. Perhaps in an unguarded moment someone had made him some promise. In any case, when the time came for the election he insisted on remaining in the national assembly, though it was suggested that as an interested party it might be more tactful for him to leave. As he sensed things were not going his way, he rushed up to the Prime Minister, who feared a physical attack and backed round the table. They completed two or three circuits with Obote explaining at a safe distance that all would be well and he must calm down. A special title of Vice President was created for him, but do not think he must have found his duties onerous. I was elected by more than two-thirds majority, but it was a secret ballot so it is not certain how many members of DP voted for me and how many of UPC against, in spite of Obote having made his support clear....." (Mutesa, E. 1967: 172)

It is also interesting to see what a Muganda academic, Professor Mutibwa thought of Mutesa's election as President of Uganda: "The choice and election of the Kabaka of Buganda, on 4 October 1963, as the first President of Uganda should not, in the normal course of events -at least in the view of the Baganda -have stirred any hairs and caused the hullabaloo it did at the time. Mutesa was the natural choice in appreciation of what Buganda had contributed to Uganda. In particular, credit was due to Sir Edward's great grandfather, Mutesa I, for what he did in consolidating Islam which he patronised for ten consecutive years, and in bringing other aspects of civilisation and modernity, particularly Christianity, to what until then was a dark corner of the African continent. But there were other aspirants to the land, the leading one being Mr (later Sir) William Wilberforce Nadiope Kadhumbula, the Kyabazinga of Busoga and the one next to Obote as chief of the ruling party, UPC. But wiser counsel, as they say, prevailed. What knocked out Nadiope from the race was an unwritten and apparently closely guarded 'understanding' between Obote and Mutesa (or Mengo, which was the same thing), while the famous alliance was being negotiated, that as part of the reward for supporting Obote to become Prime Minister at independence, the Kabaka would become the President of Uganda. And so it was, despite some stiff opposition to the choice of Mutesa and in support of the man from across the River Nile. For this, at least Obote should be commended for having stood up for his principle and word in favour of the Kabaka of Buganda. The election of Sir Edward Mutesa as the first President of Uganda was no mean that he believed went with the position he was being called achievement for Buganda. It was a landmark in the history of the kingdom and a deserving recognition of the

contribution Baganda had made to the creation and development of Uganda ever since the first White men stepped on Buganda (or Uganda) soil on 19 February 1862 and were received by Kabaka Mutesa I at his palace at Banda, near present-day Kampala. It was another event that highlighted the significance of Buganda as a major factor in the politics and history of Uganda." (Mutibwa, P.M. 2008: 66)

Identity crisis of the Baganda

A section of the first chapter of Professor Mutibwa's book bears the title: "Securing the Integrity of Buganda and the position of the Kabaka." (Mutibwa, P.M. 59) What the section discusses is really the identity crisis of the Baganda. Independence was just round the corner. And it was going to be a major turning point in the history of Uganda. Professor Wallerstein has argued: "By ethnic (read nationality) I mean the sentiment shared by a group of people who define their boundary in cultural terms (a common language, religion, color history, style of life rights in the political arena in order to defend the possibilities of their material conditions. Whether such a group prefers to call itself a nation, a nationality, or an ethnic group, a tribe, a people or any of the other sundry terms that are used is not very material to the fact that Ethnic consciousness is latent everywhere but it is only realized when groups feel either threatened with loss of previously acquired privilege or conversely feel it is opportune moment politically to overcome long-standing denial of privilege." (Wallerstein, I 1973: 168) While the rest of the country had no fears of independence-- as a matter of fact they thought it would bring them opportunity for relief, the Baganda felt their erstwhile position of dominance would be brought to an end. They were therefore facing a serious identity crisis. The best delineation of this crisis so far has been done by Terence K Hopkins of Colombia University. She wrote: "...On the surface, Uganda's politics has indeed been complex. But they have not been unstable, and they are probably no more baffling than those of any other country, once the underlying tensions they reflect are understood.

"Among these tensions one in particular has decisively shaped the country's politics, the tension between the Baganda and other peoples of Uganda. Politically, the tension takes the form of the Buganda question, the dimensions and ramifications of which are many but the core of which can simply be stated: what place should Buganda, its ruler the Kabaka, and its people the Baganda occupy in the emerging national society? It has not been an easy question for Ugandans to answer. To many Baganda, they are an elite people, endowed with a superior culture, superior economic wealth, and superior political traditions. To those among them who have thought about the matter at all, it was until fairly recently almost inconceivable that they should not provide the leadership of the new state. To many non-Baganda such claims have appeared pretentious, the wealth not wholly deserved, and the traditions a liability. While valuing much that Buganda had attained, particularly the relative well-being of its people and its political success during the colonial period, the others have been no more prepared to put up with Buganda overrule than with British overrule.

"The Buganda question and its organizing role in Uganda politics form the principal subject matter of this essay. It is for such a young country, an old problem, for its roots lie in actions taken at the very beginning of the colonial period. Only in the 1950s, however, when the nationalist movement was getting underway and Ugandans began to concern themselves with how the new state should be organized, did it come sharply into focus. But at that point it rapidly devolved into the overriding problem for the country, and it retained that position throughout both the period immediately proceeding independence and the first four years of nationhood, from 1962 to 1966, the period this essay is mainly concerned." (Hopkins, Terence K. 1967: 251).

As we have already indicated in the chapter on the social base of UPC, Buganda had been a dominant power for over 300 years before it lost that dominance to the British at the beginning of colonisation. Moreover when the British became dominant, they ensured that the Baganda as an identity had a sort of superior

status as compared to the other nationalities. Professor Mutibwa himself addresses this status issue in his book, "Uganda since Independence: a story of unfulfilled hopes."

"The riots which broke out in Buganda in the 1940s against the Kabaka, the Buganda government and the colonial administration were the first signal of resistance. Thus in politics as well as in the economic sphere the Baganda had stolen a march on the rest of the protectorate. This led to serious problems as the country moved towards independence. First it elevated the political importance of the Buganda and made the Baganda proud and arrogant in their approach to political problems. Up till the 1960s they did not consider their political destiny as part of the country as a whole." (Mutibwa, P.M. 1992: 11)

"We have maintained that the roots of Uganda's agony lie in the colonial era. We have seen the British government's deliberate policy of making Buganda into a state within a state at the same time widening the historical division between the north and south of the country. the result was to make Buganda the pivot of the protectorate, with development in the north and south proceeding at different speeds. while Pax Britannica ruled, the contradictions involved could be contained; after it ended, the motor had to be readjusted." (Mutibwa, P.M. 1992: 21)

As independence approached and, with it, the looming decline of Buganda relative to other identities/tribes, Buganda began undergoing the syndrome of a formerly dominant power on the eve of its decline. Professor Wright tells us that "...a former ruling elite minority in the early stages of its decline exhibits a tendency to think of itself and its interests as identical with those of the whole country. It is unable to recognize itself as and to protect its interests as a minority." (Wright, 60) Simultaneously, Wright also tells us, "...a former ruling elite minority is likely to regard itself as especially fit to rule the country." Professor Mutibwa unwittingly reveals this when he is talking about the Kabaka after his return from exile in 1955: "As we have noted above, the conclusion of a new agreement between the British and Buganda in 1955, as part of the settlement for the Kabaka's return from deportation, meant an enhanced position of Buganda vis-a.-vis other parts of the protectorate, something that did not go down well with the non-Buganda areas. Buganda too no doubt gained confidence from her enhanced and seemingly strengthened position vis-a.-vis the Protectorate Government, which placed her in a position somewhat above the other Ugandan regions. Buganda had now achieved a status where the only people she would negotiate with now were the British in Entebbe and London rather than with other Ugandans. Thus, Buganda continued with an intransigent stance on the decision to go it alone in complete disregard of the interests of the other regions in Uganda, including non-cooperation in formulating the roadmap to independence. This was bound to backfire, for, as far as the British were concerned, Buganda was still a mere province, a part of their protectorate on an equal footing with the rest of the protectorate." (Mutibwa, P.M. 2008: 27) Examples of what Mutibwa is talking about is the refusal to participate in the Wild Committre as well as the boycott of the 1958 elections for the Legico. (quote thee pages of the book where these things are discussed in chapter)

Another syndrome which the Baganda as a formerly dominant elite have exhibited is lack of adaptability. Again Professor Wright points out "...the self-image of dominance and superiority (even after erstwhile subordinates have ceased to believe in it) renders the declining former elite peculiarly lacking in adaptability. The British and North American Wasp is both notoriously incapable of learning foreign languages, and complacent about his own culture. I suspect that this, rather than religious fear, is the real reason why Indian Muslims lagged (if they did) behind Hindus in learning English instead of Persian in the nineteenth century. Arab traders have learned other languages when they needed them." (Wright T.P. 1976: 60) The Baganda are very poor at learning the other languages of Uganda, something which contrasts with how the others learn Luganda.

The other syndrome which the Baganda as a formerly dominant power have exhibited is the tendency to

"value and romanticise the past." (Wright, T.P. 1976: 60) We can see a lot of this in the writings of Mutibwa.

We have had to discuss the identity crisis of the Baganda in some detail because it constitutes a major impediment to the integration of the Baganda into the mainstream of national politics. Their problem is very similar to that of the Muslims of India who had been dominant in India for 600 years before the British overthrew their dominance. About the Muslim identity crisis in India, Professor Wright had this to say: ".....they are a case of status reversal in which some of them feel, rightly or wrongly, that their erstwhile Hindu subjects have become their rulers. A grasp of this perspective, and of the attitudes and values which accompany it will help to explain the difficulties which the Indian National Movement and, since independence, Government of India, has had in integrating many Muslims into the "mainstream" of national politics, as well as to explain the failure of Pakistan to accommodate its Bengali "subordinate mass subjects" in 1947-1971." (Wright, T.P. 1976: 58). And just like the case of the Muslims of India, the Baganda who had been dominant in the region for some three hundred years too feel their erstwhile subordinates have become their rulers. Professor Mutibwa tells us how the prospect of being ruled by a non-Muganda sent the Baganda into pannick: "As a reaction to the publication of the Wild Report, whose Committee Mengo had boycotted, Buganda authorities decided to demand once again separate independence for their kingdom. The Baganda appear to have been in a near panic. There were attempts to form a party of their own -the Uganda National Party (UNP) which, it was even suggested, could merge with the new UPC. It was all a gamble, especially as the Mengo Establishment was faced, apparently for the first time, with fears that Obote might become Uganda's first Prime Minister. Certainly the prospects of being governed by a non-Muganda filled the Baganda with dismay. It is against this background that the decision to renew the demand for separate independence by 1 January 1961 should be viewed." (Mutibwa, P.M. 2008: 32) Professor Mutibwa was also to write: "On the other hand, the Baganda too harbour a somewhat arrogant attitude towards the non-Baganda, particularly those who come from non-kingdom areas. For instance, an ordinary Muganda, however poor or uneducated he may be, believes that people from non-kingdom areas are unruly, uncouth and are not fit to rule." (Mutibwa, P.M. 2008: xi)

The "lost counties" issue

To grasp what was at issue with the "lost counties", we need to go into its history, its genesis. It all began in December 1893 when Colonel Colville led a full military campaign against Kabalega and the Banyoro. After suffering a series of defeats, Kabalega was driven from his country and forced to take refuge in Lango in 1894. As a reward for assistance against the Banyoro, Colonel Colville in the early part of 1894 promised the Baganda chiefs that all Bunyoro territory south of River Kafu would be incorporated into Buganda. This was roughly the area comprised of Buyaga and Bugangazzi (Bugangazzi) northern Singo, Buruli and the formerly semi-independent area of northern Bugerere which had been part of Bunyoro territory. Colonel Colville was forced by illness to leave Uganda before implementing this promise. However, when E.J.L. Berkeley who succeeded Colville was in 1896 appointing a Munyoro to be chief of this area, the Ganda chiefs present reminded him that his predecessor had pledged the area to be part of Buganda. Berkeley consulted the Foreign Office who instructed him to implement the promise. The incorporation into the Kingdom of Buganda of this territory, which was clearly part of Bunyoro with Banyoro inhabiting, was so blatantly unjust that two British officers then serving in Bunyoro (Pulteney and Forster), resigned their posts in protest against the decision. Banyoro never accepted this situation and this loss of territory was to become the festering "lost counties" issue which was a subject of many deputations by the Kingdom of Bunyoro to the British throughout the colonial period.

The "lost counties" was a serious issue at the Constitutional Conferences preparing for Uganda's independence in London. On 27 June, as the Buganda delegation was walking out of the Conference, having

sensed the dominant mood, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Maudling, delivered the verdict of the British government. Buganda and Bugangazzi were to remain part of Buganda while being administered by the Central Government, and "after not less than two years, the National Assembly shall decide on the date for a referendum - in which the people of the counties will say whether they prefer to be in Buganda or Bunyoro, or remain under the Central Government." (Mutibwa, P.M. 1982: 296) Obote, the Prime Minister, accepted this ruling but both Buganda and Bunyoro had misgivings. Dr. Majugo, a member of the Bunyoro delegation, declared on his return to Uganda, that Independence Day, 9 October, would be "a funeral in Bunyoro" and that Bunyoro would not be part of the independence celebrations. (Mutibwa, P.M. 1982: 297) Be that as it may, Uganda became independent on 9 October 1962, with Milton Obote, the leader of UPC, as head of Government.

The "lost counties" remained a very thorny issue. These counties had been turned over to Buganda as a reward for assisting in British subjugation of the Banyoro therefore independence would not be real for Banyoro before the return of the counties. Moreover, the Banyoro in the counties were being treated like colonial subjects, who were among other things being forced to abandon their language and adopt Luganda. There is no doubt that the return of the counties would restore the dignity and self-esteem of the Banyoro to a great extent. However, much as the Constitutional conference had resolved that a referendum would be held in the "lost counties" to determine where the residents wanted to be administered from, things were not that easy and straightforward. The imminence of this referendum unleashed one of the most fervent political struggles Uganda has known. The protagonists in this struggle were the forces of national-democratic liberation led by Obote, on the one hand, and Buganda chauvinism organized by the neo-traditionalists on the other.

As the Government of the day was an alliance between UPC and KY, the latter having a stake in the referendum, the UPC leadership had to ensure that it had the necessary parliamentary strength to pass the legislation authorizing and laying down the ground rules for the referendum. By the middle of 1964 this strength had been attained, and Parliament passed the Referendum Bill which provided that only those registered to vote in the counties in 1962 would be eligible to vote. This provision was aimed at excluding the Baganda ex-servicemen who the Buganda administration was settling into the area under the so-called Ndaiga scheme intended to influence the results of the referendum. The Ndaiga scheme had been set up as a device to make double sure Buganda did not lose the "lost counties". To accord it legitimacy, the Kabaka had lent it his personal involvement. He had moved in and resided in the "lost counties" for sometime. One Sunday the Kabaka "went on an expedition to the lost counties with 8,000 ex-servicemen, demonstrated his royal prerogative of being above the law by one morning shooting nine Banyoro peasants gathered in a market place..." (Mamdani 1976: 244). The scheme had also been allocated money well in excess of 30,000 British pounds. Notwithstanding all these efforts, when the results of the referendum were declared on 5th November, the residents had voted overwhelmingly to be part of the Kingdom of Bunyoro. It was a decision that was welcomed not only in Bunyoro, but by all the minority nationalities/identities in the country.

The loss of these counties was very painful to Buganda. "The crisis over the loss of the 'Lost Counties' to Bunyoro brought other developments in Mengo. When the results of the referendum were announced there was a state of despondency, confusion and disbelief at Mengo, if not in the rest of the kingdom. During the session of the Great Lukiiko at Bulange that debated the matter, Kabaka's ministers were shouted down from the rowdy crowd in the public gallery. The Katikkiro of Buganda, Michael Kintu, was heckled and shouted down as he addressed the Lukiiko. He was booed and insulted as he left the Lukiiko Hall and he was rescued from the angry crowd wanting to lynch him by officials of the Lukiiko who guided him out of the Bulange Building through a back door and smuggled him out of sight in a Volkswagon! Michael Kintu resigned as Katikkiro....." (Mutibwa, P.M. 80) It is great irony that when Kintu's resignation was announced, the crowd celebrated as though some sort of victory had been won.

The Gulu Conference, 1964.

Professor Mutibwa is right to say: "The first serious issues which preoccupied the UPC, after it came to power at independence, were internal problems centred on ideology and rivalry over the leadership of the party." (Mutibwa 73) However, he is wrong in asserting that what he calls the rivalry in UPC caused the 1966 revolution or to use his own words "...the falling out of Obote and Ibingira, which occurred around the beginning of 1965, appears to have been one of the 'immediate' causes of the 1966 Crisis." (Mutibwa, P.M. 88) Demonstrating why he is wrong should not detain us here; we shall do that later.....In the meantime, let us deal with the Annual Delegates conference of 1964.

The most important event that took place at the conference in Gulu was the election of Secretary General of the party. To understand this election we need to give a brief characterisation of the two candidates, John Kakonge and Grace Ibingira. The following is a characterisation given by a contemporary:

(1)"Ibingira rarely committed himself on issues unless he could do so in terms that all major forces felt supported their position. His speeches were models of platitudes dressed in superficially new and intellectual language. His forums were the corridors and ante-rooms, not the market places, of power. His tools were the private conversation and the mutual special interest, not the public address or the shared concern for national welfare. In short Grace Ibingira had the courage of all the day's popular convictions and the conviction that more power should be his. He and his close ally -then Vice-President and Kyabazinga of Busoga -Sir Wilberforce Nadiope, had wide contacts among the more conservative and aristocratic UPC local notables. Ibingira is Bahima, that is a member of the cattle-raising aristocracy; who ruled the Kingdom Ankole on watered down Tussi lines. He is 'therefore a Southerner, 'but not strictly speaking a Bantu. He and Nadiope were instrumental in convincing Dr. Obote that Kakonge was a danger to him and in securing his removal in

'favour of Ibingira. Ibingira's support sprang from four sources: (a) the Ankole UPC Machine, which he later lost to a commoner who had crossed the floor from the Democratic Party, Basil Bataringaya, now Minister of the Interior; (b) a collection of ambitious Southern local and district leaders who wanted power and feared what they saw as Prime Minister Obote's populism; (c) a coterie of relatively conservative intellectuals who viewed Obote as pedestrian and lacking in polish and glitter (which most of his speeches are); and (d) a growing working relationship with Mengo Palace and the " separatist" Kiganda aristocracy headed by the then President and Kabaka Sir Frederick Mutesa. Until October 1965 Grace Ibingira was a Machiavellian of The Prince. Thereafter, he seems to have become intoxicated by the nearness of power and forgotten the danger of wounding his opponent while leaving him the power to strike back at a time of his choosing.

(2)"JOHN KAKONGE, Minister of Economic Development and Planning, is a very different man. He is a radical nationalist. Despite his aristocratic Nyoro background he has no roots there. A professed "scientific socialist" he has more in common with Yugoslav revisionism, the quasi-Marxist radicalism of Michael Foot, or the philosophy of African radical social reconstruction enunciated in vague words and concrete actions by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and TANU, than with Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. A strong proponent of East African federation and co-operation, he is well thought of both in Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam. The most striking point about John Kakonge, however, is that he is basically not a politician either by inclination or natural ability. As UPC Secretary-General (1960-64), he built the mass base and party structure that won the 1962 elections - a base Ibingira allowed to erode away within a year of taking office. As Director of Planning (1963 onward) he supervised the creation of Work for Progress. He was and is an effective speaker: charismatic to mass audiences, studiously grounded and substantive to intellectual ones. No one would deny that John Kakonge has definite ideas how Uganda should develop in the interest of Ugandans or that he believes that

the political system and political power are critical to realising them. However, Kakonge has never shown adequate understanding that to carry out his aims for Uganda he must hold and use political power nor a fortiori that he, as a radical and a man with power in his hands, inevitably has political enemies who seek his downfall. At Gulu, he might have 'held the Secretary-Generalship against Obote and Ibingira had he not believed up to the last moment that both were his friends. (He held to this faith despite the warnings of his supporters.) After Gulu he did not fight back. His excursion into Buganda politics in 1965 like his condemnation of US-Congo policy early in that year and of "hired agents of foreign powers " (Ibingira and Co.) in October were fairly clearly in loyal support, and partly at the behest of, Prime Minister Obote. Apart from his lonely vote on the Ocheng Inquiry motion and an earlier muddled and withdrawn, criticism of the Nyoro aristocracy (whom he detests as did his father, a member of the puritan Balokale sect of the Anglican Church of Uganda) when such criticism seemed to attack Obote's Bunyoro supporters, John Kakonge took no active part in the 1966 political events. A man of ideas and ideals but also of programmes and organising ability, an intellectual by temperament and ambition if not fully by training nor uniformly performance, John Kakonge is not fully a politician: Perhaps this is largely because he is very unwilling to believe any individual he knows can be basically hostile to his ideals or to him, a noble illusion but a very dangerous one in political life." (Andre e la Rue 1967)

Theory and history (or experience) teaches us that "...it may take a long time for national democratic liberation revolutions to determine their social orientations since this is not an instantaneous and irrevocable action but a consequence of contradictory processes, progressive movements and retreats. In other words, it may be drawn out over virtually the whole period of the revolution and take place at both its phases. The national democratic (and also the popular democratic) tendency of development in the revolution can gain the upper hand either at the first or the second phase of the evolution." (Bruntents, K.N. part one 1977: 148) And so what took place in Gulu in 1964 was just an aspect of UPC as a national-democratic liberation movement trying to determine its orientation. There were two forces in this struggle. There was the national-democratic forces represented by Milton Obote. I must hasten to say that by 1964 this force was still not clear about the struggle. That is why it was split by Grace Ibingira who was leading the anti-national-democratic forces. Grace Ibingira, as Kirunda Kivejinja has said, was "...a gifted palace politician . He had a tongue so agile he could desuade a couple from joining in matrimony even if they were a step away from the waiting priest." (Kirunda Kivejinja 79-80; also quoted in Mutibwa, P.M. 2008: 76).He was also He used both faculties to soil John Kakaonge, a true national-democrat and turn Milton Obote against John Kakonge. Thereafter with the support of the notables, he went on to capture the important position of Secretary General of the party at the Annual Delegates Conference held in Gulu.

After his election as Secretary General of the party, in December 1964, Grace Ibingira left for the US to shop for funds and support. William Wilberforce Nadiope and other Ibingira supporters were also to make trips to the US. It is said that while they were in the US "...they freely hinted that Dr Obote would soon be out of office and that the USA could expect a more friendly and responsible government when they assumed power." (Andre de la Rue Part two page 24) From the US, Grace Ibingira returned with money estimated by Obote to be one million dollars. (Obote, A.M. 1968:35). "By 1965 there was a sudden manifestation of opulence among a section of UPC leadership generally associated with Ibingira, including Branch Chairman. There was talk about Ibingira and "the dollars" at all levels of the party."(Nabudere, D.W. 1980:259) With this money, the resistance to national-democratic liberation embarked on a protracted struggle to remove Obote from the leadership of the UPC.

As though to underscore his national-democratic credentials as well as draw a stark contrast with Ibingira, Dr Obote later in the middle of 1965 made a prolonged visit to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China. "On his return Dr Obote was greeted by a concerted series of increasingly bitter challenges to his

visits and foreign policy. In a blazing speech--whose lack of specific names was a device which left few Ugandans in doubt as to its targets--Minister of State Grace Ibingira claimed that Dr Obote has aligned himself with the East, forfeited Uganda's independence external position, or betrayed his party. For this, Ibingira held, he must be summarily removed from Office. Speaking for the Prime Minister, A.A. Nekyon (Obote's kinsman from Lango and his regular hatchet man) and John Kakonge in substantive near identical addresses blasted certain Ugandan politicians--self-evidently the Ibingira group--as bought agents of a foreign power 9presumably the USA in Kakonge's speech, slightly more flexibly identifiable in Nekyon's) whose betrayal of the people of Uganda must lead to removal by the proper authorities (Dr Obote and a UPC Delegates conference)." (Andre de la Rue: 1967: 24-25)

As Andre de la Rue observed of this debate, "...foreign policy was not central in the thinking or strategy of either camp--the prize was government." The struggle had begun. Before this debate, Grace Ibingira had enlisted the support (nay involvement) of the Kabaka of Buganda in his struggles against Obote. This must not have been that difficult. In the first place the Kabaka was well-predisposed to working with Grace Ibingira against any moves of the national-democratic liberation. As a king and a leader of the dominating identity, he was not only a target of but was ideologically inclined to fight national-democratic liberation. In fact we are told by Professor Mutibwa that the Kabaka and his advisers were actually on the hunt for allies outside Buganda. "That was why Mutesa and his advisers, who included influential people such as Prince Badru Kakungulu, his uncle and the leader of Uganda Muslim Community, worked out plans which would get them political friends outside Buganda while at the same time controlling their sub-state. In this lies the plan of their coalition with Grace Ibingira, the Secretary General of the UPC -i.e. to join and penetrate the UPC with the aim of outvoting Obote in his party. The Baganda faithfully joined the UPC en masse, and strengthened Ibingira's group which consisted of all those leaders who came from families that possessed traditional authority in the colonial system, who now ranged against the centre of the party led by Obote. Such leaders included men like as Nadiope (Kyabazinga of Busoga and the Vice-President of Uganda and UPC), Matia Ngobi and George Magezi. Mutesa saw the rift between the Right and the Centre of the UPC, and he decided to exploit it." (Mutibwa, P.M. 89-90) More pointedly Mutibwa tells us: "The political dispute between Obote and Ibingira and his supporters centered around the control of UPC and ultimately the very leadership of the country in terms of the political and economic ideologies that were to be followed. Obote claimed--not without justification--that Ibingira's group which included President Sir Edward Mutesa and the Buganda government at Mengo and counted on the the support and assistance of the Army Commander Brigadier Opolot wanted to remove him from power, and that plans to this end were in advanced stage by the end of 1965. No one let alone Ibingira and his supporters has denied that they wanted to see Obote and those who believed in socialist philosophies removed. Their only regret is that they failed." (Mutibwa, P. 1992: 38)

Initially the alliance worked on enlarging the Annual Delegates Conference of UPC, the organ which elects the President of the party, in such a manner that the resistance to national-democratic liberation would be in the majority. (Obote, A.M. 1968:20) For this, a scheme which Professor Mazrui appropriately named the "Trojan Horse" was contrived. As many Baganda as possible were to be "herded" into UPC. To effect this, in July 1965 Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda and President of Uganda convened and chaired a meeting of KY at which it was decided that KY members should join UPC in large numbers. Once in the party they were to use their numerical strength to change the leadership of the party. To spur the Baganda into joining the UPC, members of the Cabinet who were part of the plot, deliberately leaked to the press cabinet resolutions on the plan to call surprise elections. In the leakage it was pointed out that the impending elections could effect the re-election of Mutesa as President of Uganda, unless the Baganda were in a commanding position within the UPC. As expected the leakage alarmed the Baganda, and they enlisted as members of the UPC in large numbers. As all this was happening, in the absence of Obote, who was out the country visiting the Far East, Grace Ibingira as Secretary General of UPC convened an executive meeting of

the party to consider proposals to increase the number of representatives from Buganda to the National Council from 3 to 18. (Obote, A.M. 1968: 23) Much as this proposal was resoundingly defeated, it was tabled again for discussion in the first week of October 1965 when it was once again defeated.

When it became clear that the "Trojan Horse" stratagem could not work, Obote's opponents resorted to attempting an outright military coup. Scheduled to take place on Independence Day (9th October, 1965), clear evidence of it first got revealed on 7th October 1965. That day five incidents which initially appeared coincidental, but which were later found to have been orchestrated occurred. First, Obote in his capacity as Prime Minister received a letter from Mengo (Mutesa) informing him that a group of left-wingers (Communists) were intending to overthrow the Government on or about 9th October 1965. The letter requested the Prime Minister as head of Government to issue a statement condemning any such plot. The second incident was an allegation made at the end of a Cabinet meeting by Grace Ibingira that he had uncovered a plot to assassinate several people, including himself, during the independence anniversary. The third was a letter written to the Minister of Internal Affairs by the late Daudi Ochieng, KY Member of Parliament, and copied to the Prime Minister, requesting the Minister to send a senior Police Officer to take statement from an unnamed person regarding the activities of Idi Amin, Deputy Commander of the Army. In the letter Daudi Ochieng observed that upon taking the statement, the Government would suspend Amin from the Army.

The fourth incident was a report by the then Commander of the Uganda Army, Shaban Opolot, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense that Opolot had received information that Baganda were plotting to assassinate him, and that soldiers from the Congo would attack the headquarters of the Uganda Army during the independence anniversary celebrations. The object of all these reports - all of which were investigated and found to be false -- was to create confusion and panic so that the coup could be carried out.

The fifth aspect of the conspiracy was the activities of Major Katabarwa, brother of Grace Ibingira who was Commandant of the Army Training Wing stationed in Jinja. He went to Kampala on 7th October, 1965 and on return to Jinja contacted a number of officers, including two who were on open charge and therefore not on duty, to draw arms and report to Brigadier Opolot at Army Headquarters in Kampala. However, much as these officers reported and "virtually took control of the Army Headquarters", the army refused to carry out their orders and the intended coup failed.

The failure of the October coup plot did not discourage the plotters, rather it spurred them to make a more daring attempt. The major move in this attempt was made in November, 1965 when Brigadier Opolot arranged for two units of the Army to exchange barracks. (Obote, A.M. 1968:23) The intention of this change was to remove the army unit stationed in Jinja, and which had refused to participate in the coup attempt the previous month. However, according to the regulations then in force, such a change could only take place after notification which have been issued be given six months prior, and with the approval of the Chief of Defense Staff Committee composed of senior officers and chaired by the Minister responsible for Defense. Brigadier Opolot was violating all the regulations." The notification was made on 28th November 1965 in a secret letter to the Commanders of the two units, and the change over was to be completed by the end of December 1965. The Chief of Defense Staff Committee knew nothing about the change, and the Ministry was not informed although the secret letter was said to have been copied to the Ministry." (Obote, A.M. 1968: 23) The secret leaked out and Obote ordered Brigadier Opolot to follow proper procedure.

Then in December 1965, Mutesa placed orders for heavy weapons with a Kampala firm. The arms were to come from Britain. On this Obote was later to write: "We have letters from a British firm which show that the firm was not happy with the orders on the grounds that the weapons ordered were too heavy for an individual and that the firm had always dealt with Governments only. One of the letters from the Kampala firm states that President Mutesa had placed the orders on behalf of the Uganda Army and that, although the Kabaka's Government was to pay for the arms, that only meant that the President, in his capacity as the Kabaka, was to have the first trial of arms before handing them over to the army." (Obote, A.M. 1968) The next move was made in Parliament on 4th February 1966. Daudi Ochieng', a KY Member of Parliament moved a motion: "That this House do urge the Government to suspend from duty Col. Idi Amin of the Uganda Army forthwith pending conclusions of police investigations into allegations regarding his bank account which should be passed on to the appropriate authority whose decision on the matter should be made public." (Obote, A.M. 1968: 24-25) During the course of introducing his motion, Ochieng' took liberty to cast aspersions on the credibility of Obote (the Prime Minister), Felix Onama (the Minister of Defense), and Adoko Nekyon (the Minister of Planning). The three officials, Ochieng' alleged, had improperly obtained ivory, gold and money from Congolese rebels. Daudi Ochieng' asserted that within 24 days of 5th February, 1965, Amin had banked a total of 340,000 Uganda shillings - at that time definitely a very large sum of money.

The context in which these allegations were being made was the situation in which the Government of Uganda was involved in covert operations to aid the rebel (Mujaju, A.B. 1987: 484) government led by Gbenye which was fighting against the newly installed government of Congo (Kinshasha) then headed by Moise Tshombe. The Congolese government had retaliated by bombing villages in the then West Nile District of Uganda. The bombings were well known in Uganda, and Ochieng sought to take advantage of it to arouse anger and outrage in the country by cynically portraying the money as a kind of war booty which should have been reported to the government but which Amin improperly put to personal use. Presented thus, Amin needed to be investigated. The object of this motion, however, was not so much to seek investigation nor was it to seek a vote of censure on the officials mentioned; rather, it was two-fold. First, it was intended to provide the premise from which Amin could be temporarily removed from the post of Chief-of-Staff, where he constituted a stumbling block to the planned coup. Secondly, the motion and the discussion consequent to it was to create what "The Guardian" called optimum conditions for a coup. (Mujaju, A.B. 1987) The accuracy of this observation is borne out by the fact that at the Cabinet meeting to discuss the motion, "those Ministers who had sought to achieve their objectives on 4th of February, did not like the subsequent appointment of a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the allegations."(Obote, A.M. 1968: 26) They merely wanted action on suspension.

As all this was happening, Obote maintained his cool and continued with his schedules as usual. The previous November he had promised but not fixed a date to tour the northern region in January or February of 1966. The date for the tour was fixed in January, and he left for the tour in on February the 1st. While still on the tour, a platoon of soldiers was sent to the north to bring Obote back to Kampala, dead or alive. This attempt to kidnap Obote was a desperate move the resistance took after failing to get the troops to overthrow the government. When this kidnapping also failed, another desperate attempt was made by way of requesting the British High Commissioner for military assistance on February the 8th. This too failed. Obote returned to Kampala on his own volition on 12th February and, in his own words, realized "the situation was very serious."(Obote, A.M. 1968: 25) He immediately ordered the troops back to their barracks, and sought to discuss the situation with Mutesa, the then President. He also convened an emergency meeting of the Cabinet on 14th February at which he called on the Ministers who had lost confidence in him, and had believed in the allegations by Daudi Ochieng to resign. None resigned. Three

days later Obote left for official duties in Nairobi, returning on 19th February when he learned of a circular by Brigadier Opolot to all army units, directing them to go for field exercises. In this circular," Opolot actually stated that because the situation had been normal throughout February 1966, and because for some period of months the army had not done field exercises, February 1966 was the most suitable."(Obote, A.M. 1968: 26) Obote found these observations curious to say the least, ordered cancellation of the exercises and later took what he termed "drastic action". The drastic action was the detention of the five ministers involved in the plot to overthrow the government.

The detention of the five ministers completely upset the strategy of the anti-national-democratic forces, and set the stage for a confrontation which would result in a national-democratic revolution. With Ibingira out of circulation, the leadership of the anti-national-democratic forces reverted to Kabaka Mutesa. However, lacking the political acumen of Ibingira, Mutesa was like a "rudderless ship moving from blunder to blunder" and playing right into Obote's hands. Viewing the situation unveiled by the detention of the ministers as requiring drastic measures, Mutesa took steps to arrange for a military takeover. For this he enlisted the support and participation of Brigadier Opolot, and also sought military intervention by a foreign country, suspected to be Britain. When none of these could materialize, Mutesa, as Kabaka of Buganda issued an ultimatum for the Central Government to vacate the soil of Buganda before May 30, 1966. Although he later said this was a mere bargaining chip, both his friends and foes interpreted the ultimatum to mean de facto secession of Buganda from the rest of Uganda. As a response to the ultimatum, Obote, as head of the Government of Uganda, declared a state of emergency throughout Uganda. Subsequently, on the 1st of June, in a move which treated the ultimatum as act of rebellion, Obote ordered units of the Uganda Army to march on the Kabaka's palace at Mengo. It had been reported that the Kabaka had amassed arms in the palace in readiness for war, and the troops were to search the palace. A battle between the advancing Uganda Army and the palace "guards" ensued. As Professor Mutibwa tells us the battle was stiff: "Although Mutesa, assisted by his lieutenants equipped with Lee-Enfield rifles put up a stiff resistance and Amin forces were obliged to call in large contingent of reinforcements, it was not to be expected that Mengo could hold out for long against the Uganda army." (Mutibwa, P.M. 1992: 39) Eventually, after twelve hours of fierce fighting, the Uganda Army established control. The Kabaka had escaped from the palace, and the stage set for a new order in Uganda.

The process of defining the national-democratic revolution in Uganda went through two stages. The first was the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution and its replacement by the 1966 Constitution, which, though interim, made sweeping changes. It nullified all federal provisions which had been the principal character-defining aspect of the old order as enshrined in the 1962 Constitution, and replaced them with instruments for a single unified government. The kingdom of Buganda and the three federal states of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro lost their autonomy and semi-autonomy respectively; Buganda lost its right to elect its Members of Parliament indirectly; and the Kabaka of Buganda lost his privileged status. At the national arena, the posts of Prime Minister and leader of government, as well as that of ceremonial President were abolished and in their place was instituted the post of executive President. This interim Constitution was effective for a year, and then the 1967 Constitution that gave the final definition to the national-democratic revolution was passed by Parliament sitting as a constituent assembly. The 1967 totally overhauled the body politic of Uganda.

One of the major things the Constitution did was to abolish the institution of the monarchy. By this abolition, the national-democratic revolution had initiated a process of eradicating the survivals of pre-capitalist ideological structures which were either a hindrance to or a drawback to the social progress of the country. In feudal societies," monarchs are symbolically, and indeed actually, the centre around which society is organized as a state. They are considered mediators between the various parts and interests that make up

the social order and between the human and extra-human worlds. The king holds the social cosmos together. Thus his rule is, like that of the supreme being of man's religious systems, a symbol of totality." (Grottaneli, C 1987: 313; Ray, B.C 1991: 202) As a result, the monarch is the central symbol of power and legitimacy -- a situation totally inimical to the evolution of the Ugandan nation and the adoption of democratic governance in the country.

By abolishing the kingdom of Buganda and demarcating it into four districts, Obote instituted fundamental changes in the social and political climate of the society of the former kingdom. Up to 1967 Ganda society was a curious mixture of the pre-colonial social structure and the colonial one instituted through the 1900 Agreement. Pre-colonial Ganda society has been described as characterized by "the absence of cohesive and clearly delineated strata, but not, of course in the sense of egalitarianism." (Tuden, A. & Plotnicov, L. 1970: 141) All those who occupied position of authority had objective and economic advantage. These positions also accrued immense social status and prestige. Below the strata of the officials were the "Baganda" common people the undistinguished ordinary people who were not something else. These were the people who did manual labor and paid tribute to the chiefs. As Wrigley observes "inequality seemed natural to the Buganda; it aroused envy but not resentment." (Wrigley, C.C. 1964: 20) Upon this pre-colonial polity, the British, through the 1900 Agreement, superimposed a social structure based on religious affiliation and some degree of class differentiation. In colonial Buganda, one's religion determined one's status and advancement in the Buganda civil service; however, in situations where there were two competitors of the same religion, then the social class in a system which came to be known as "mwana wani (whose child)" tipped the balance. The operation of all this intricate system was nominally in the hands of the Kabaka whose power was exercised by those around him, the neo-traditionalists. The abolition of the Kabakaship and the kingdom, and their replacement by the district administration brought all this to an end. By instituting district appointment boards, a measure of meritocracy was introduced and one's qualifications rather than family or religion was to determine the appointments.

The abolition of the kingdom of Buganda and the demarcation of the territory of the former kingdom into four administrative districts had major long-term consequences for the relations between Buganda and the rest of Ugandans. We have already alluded to the chauvinism of the Baganda, an attitude which set them apart from the rest of the Ugandans. In addition to the sources of this chauvinism which we have already which we have already elaborated upon, another contributing factor was the erroneous comparison which would be made between Buganda and other entities. Unable to isolate the operation of the factors of economies of scale and the differential treatment of Buganda by the colonialists, the Baganda chauvinists ascribed their apparent relative success to what they viewed as the intrinsic superior qualities of the Baganda. From this attitude soon developed an acute form of superiority complex. None other than Abu Mayanja, long-regarded as a "progressive Muganda" was to succinctly express this complex in April, 1962 when he said that while the Constitution could create legal equality in Uganda, natural equality could never exist. (Hancock, I.R. 1966: 265; Mayanja, A.) This kind of attitude was not only setting the Baganda apart from the rest of the country, it also constituted a form of oppression which results from attitudes. (Linlon, R. 1943: 500, 502) As this was arising from Ganda chauvinism, which in turn was also arising from the sense of belonging to a superior entity, the abolition of the kingdom of Buganda brought all this to an end. In the words of Ali Mazrui: "In 1966 Buganda was humbled." (Mazrui, A.A. 1970: 1087) There is no doubt that the nurturing of Ganda humility in place of chauvinism was an essential pre-requisite for the greater integration of Uganda.

The social structure of the former Ankole kingdom was also to be overhauled by the national-democratic revolution. In the dim past, probably several centuries back, the Bahima pastoralists arrived in present Ankole, conquered the Bairu who were the indigenous population and established Hima domination in the area. This domination was "expressed by inferior legal status and the obligation of tribute paying; and along

with inferior legal status went inferior social status amounting essentially to a caste difference." (Oberg, K. 1940: 128) The dividing line between Bahima and Bairu was not only marked by race - the Bahima have different racial features from Bairu; but also by certain prohibitions and different modes of livelihood. The Bahima depended for their livelihoods on cattle while the Bairu on agriculture. The Bairu were not permitted to own productive cows; nor were they allowed to marry Hima girls yet Hima boys could take Bairu girls for concubines. If a Mwiru came to possess a productive cow, any Muhima had the right to take it from him. The Bairu were barred from military service and no Mwiru could hold high official positions. Traditionally too, the Bairu were serfs whose exploitation took the form of tribute in food and labor. Furthermore, they had no political status being serfs.

To maintain this system of oppression and exploitation, the Bahima had not only to get politically organized and also to evolve a state apparatus. Centered around the Mugabe (King) as the hub of Hima political apparatus, the Hima state provided protection against foreign aggression and also maintained Bairu in a subordinate position. When the British came, they merely refashioned the Hima state and, through the system of indirect rule, used it to run this part of the colony. Thus British colonialism, for the time that it lasted, served to entrench Hima domination over the Bairu, with the ruling stratum in Ankole being numerically dominated by Bahima throughout the colonial period. As time went on, colonialism occasioned social development that undermined social stratification along caste lines. "The effect of modern education was to instill egalitarian orientations and aspirations among an increasing number of Bairu giving rise to a growing sense of dissatisfaction over their status as second class citizens. Bairu also developed an awareness of greater self-sufficiency from this mastery of modern skills, as well as from new sources of income made available to them through the cultivation and sale of cash crops" (). This led Bairu to demand for equality, particularly following the Second World War. In this agitation against Hima domination, the most articulate and vocal voices came from those who eventually became leading figures in the Ankole branch of UPC.

The abolition of the kingdoms and their paraphernalia brought to rest these struggles: the dominance of the Bahima over the Bairu came to an end. The other structure that got overhauled by the national-democratic revolution of 1966 was the Babito dominance of the former kingdoms of Toro and Bunyoro. The abolition of the monarchy, which was the hub of the power of the Babito caste in the in the two kingdoms, also dismantled the three-tier social structure of the two kingdoms. Up to 1966 the social structure of Bunyoro and Toro consisted of the Babito caste at the pinnacle, followed by the cattle-keeping Hima, and the cultivating Iru at the lowest rang of the ladder. These social scales were marked by status, privileges and prestige. Thus the Babito furnished the kingdoms with the ruling dynasty, and most of the chieftainship went to them by virtue of a mythical charter. "The Babito were chosen long ago to rule us," an old peasant once told Professor Beattie, "if it were not for them there would be no royal line to govern, and to be governed by Bairu would be intolerable." (Beattie, J. 1971: 100) Such feudal tendencies pervaded the whole Nyoro society, and tended to be reinforced by the monarchy. The Babito expected to be treated with feudal decorum and the common people felt obligated to do so. All this was brought to an end by the 1966 revolution.

Following the revolution, there was some resistance, and some of those who were leading the resistance got arrested. Among those who got arrested was Michael Matovu, the Saza Chief of Buddu in Buganda; he was arrested on May 26 1966. On September 6th 1966 Matovu applied for a writ of habeas corpus, and the case came before Justice Jeffrey Jones on September 14 1966. (525) Because the application raised questions about the validity or constitutionality of the 1966 Constitution, Justice Jeffrey Jones referred the matter to a higher court for interpretation. The court to interpret the question raised consisted of three Judges: Sir Udo Udoma, the Chief Justice and two other judges, C.J. Sheridan and Jeffrey Jones. This is the case which has come to be known as: Uganda vs Commissioner of Prisons, ex parte Matovu. Abu Mayanja represented the

applicant, Michael Matovu and the Attorney General, Godfrey Binaisa and Nkambo Mugerwa, Solicitor General represented the respondent. In their judgment read by the Chief Justice, Sir Udo Udoma, the judges argued: "In his alternative submission namely that the 1966 Constitution is a valid Constitution in law because it came into existence as a result of a revolution or a coup d'etat, the learned Attorney General would appear to be on firm ground.

The learned Attorney General urged the Court to hold that the incidents which finally culminated in the promulgation of the 1966 had taken place abruptly. Most people were taken unawares. What happened then was a coup d'etat. And coup d'etats are recognised in international law as a proper and effective legal means of changing governments or constitutions in countries like Uganda, which is politically and completely independent and sovereign. In his attractive and impressive submission, the learned Attorney General contended that the four cardinal requirements in international law to give the 1966 Constitution and Government of Uganda validity in law have clearly been fulfilled. These requirements are:

1. That there must be an abrupt political change, i.e. a coup d'etat or a revolution
2. The change must not have been within the contemplation of an existing Constitution.
3. The change must destroy an entire legal order except what is preserved; and
4. The new Government and Constitution must be effective.

Developing his arguments on these requirements, counsel submitted that the declaration of the Prime Minister on February 22 1966, annex a: followed by the statement of February 24 1966, in which the 1962 Constitution was suspended; the seizure of all power by the prime Minister; the setting up of the Security Council for Uganda; the forcible ejection of the President and Head of state and Commander-in-chief from State House, in consequence in which the later ultimately fled the country; the abolition of the 1962 constitution, followed immediately by the promulgation of the 1966 Constitution by resolution of the National Assembly; the removal from the 1966 of the Order in Council by the authority of which the 1962 Constitution was established; the automatic assumption of office by operation of law by the then Prime Minister as executive president of Uganda with the power to appoint anyone as Vice President of Uganda; the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council; the abolition of the federal system of government and High Court of Buganda; and the enfranchisement of the people of Buganda who had been disenfranchised since 1962--all these were not only abrupt but such fundamental changes not within the contemplation of the 1962 Constitution and therefore revolutionary in character. The end result was in law a revolution." (Udo Udoma 1966: 534-535 also referred to in Kasfir, N. page 201 note 12)

The foregoing is a legal perspective, there is also a Marxist perspective, based on structural analysis. This perspective stems from the fact that the colonisation of Uganda was a means of imposing the capitalist mode of production in the area that became Uganda. In the initial period of its imposition the capitalist mode of production does not have the wherewithal to operate. It therefore "...subsumes the labour process as it finds it, it takes over an existing labour process, developed by different and more archaic modes of production....The work may become more intensive, its duration may be extended, it may become more continuous or orderly under the eye of the interested capitalist, but in themselves these changes do not affect the character of the labour process, the actual mode of working" (Marx, K. 1977: 1021; also quoted in Han, D.R. 1992: 88) This is done through a process called articulation of modes of production. That is to say the modes of production which have been operating up to the point of colonisation are articulated to the incoming capitalist mode of production. This stems from a clear realisation "that capitalism can never immediately and totally eliminate the preceding modes of production, nor above all relations of exploitation which characterise these modes of production. On the contrary, during an entire period it must reinforce these relations of exploitation, since it is only this development which permits its own provisioning of goods coming from these modes of production or with men driven from these modes of production and therefore

compelled to sell their labour power to capitalism in order to survive." (Hahn, D.R. 1992: 13; also cited in Forster-Carter 1978: 47-78). What we then have is a process which Charles Bettelheim captured very well when he said that the pre-capitalist modes of production are "both undermined and perpetuated at the same time" in a process he called "conservation-dissolution". (Alavi, H. 1982: 175 ff 6) However, as the dissolution or undermining process gets under way, the pre-capitalist modes of production do not take things lying down; they resist and thus giving rise to contradictions. One instance of the contradiction between the capitalist mode of production and the pre-capitalist modes of production did occur in Buganda in the 1920s. At colonisation, since the incoming capitalist system did not have a labour process of its own, it was decided that in Buganda the feudal production system then in place would be utilised. Initially, this worked very well. However, the potential of the arrangement got exhausted and it eventually became a fetter to production. "As fruits of increased cultivation were appropriated in the form of bussulu and nvujjo, the tenant lost all material incentive to extend his cultivation of cash crops. In fact in the second decade of colonial rule cotton acreage declined in Buganda from 27,380 acres in 1911-1912 to 20,100 in 1916-1917, while it increased in Eastern Province from 29,720 to 97,961 acres in the same years." (Mamdani, M. 1976: 122-123) To remedy this problem, the colonial authorities passed the Bussulu and Nvujjo Law of 1928 which put a limit on what the landlord could appropriate and guaranteed the tenant complete and hereditary security of tenure. According to Mamdani: "The effect of the law was to render the relation between landlord and tenant by and large formal, substantially robbing it of its class content." There were other contradiction in which the capitalist mode of production sought to supplant the pre-capitalist ones such as the one which led to the deportation of Kabaka Mutesa which we discussed in chapter 3. Of all these contradictions, the most serious was to occur in 1966 and resulted in the abolition of the monarchy and the transformation of Uganda into a republic..

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