

The infantile Marxism of Yoweri Museveni

by Yoga Adhola

On Saturday, December 6, 2014 Capital FM aired its Capital Gang show with President Museveni as the special guest. The discussion was later transcribed and published in The Observer of Sunday, 7th December 2014. Part of the discussion went as follows:

Ssemujju: Mr President, you came to power when you were forty; almost my age.

Museveni: But I wasn't infantile, I was young biologically, but mature ideologically... so, it's the content, not the age that matters.

What, however, is the ideology Museveni is talking about? Although the NRM or Museveni himself has never declared the ideology they are following, we shall not be too wrong to guess that it is some form of Marxism. We are led to this guess by two reasons. One, it is only Marxism that one develops or grows into; all other ideologies are acquired unconsciously. Secondly, we are led to this guess by Museveni's use of Marxist concepts. Museveni himself also does carry himself as some sort of left-wing ideologue. At times he actually poses as a Marxist, and that pause is often mistaken by people who view him as a Marxist. Even as prestigious a left-wing journal as the New Left Review was taken in by this pause. Victoria Brittain, a former Associate Foreign Editor of the Guardian (British) wrote in the prestigious the New Left Review: "The liberation of Uganda by what its protagonists called 'a protracted people's war' took exactly five years. Such a change of government under armed popular pressure rather than by a coup d'etat has never before been achieved in Africa. Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) was trained in the bush war to a level of discipline and organization which completely outclassed the corrupt government army still nominally reliant on a British Ministry of Defence training team twenty years after independence. Repercussions on other repressive neo-colonial regimes in the region—notably Kenya—are inevitable in the medium if not the short term." (Brittain, V. 1986)

Professor Kanyeihamba too had this to say: "However, both before, during and after the Moshi Conference deliberations, Museveni was also perceived and portrayed by many Ugandans and foreign observers generally, as a Marxist and communist who believed in and would impose dangerous leftist or worse, still communistic beliefs and practices on Uganda and who would, if given the opportunity, deliver the country into the hands of the masters of communism. This belief had been strengthened by the knowledge of his educational background and political friends and support from countries professing the principles of the same political system." (Kanyeihamba, G.W. 212) Professor Ogot, formerly of the University of Nairobi also wrote: "At the University of Dar es salaam (1967-70) he (Museveni) developed a coherent ideological outlook which was largely Marxist." (Ogot, B.A. 2002: 374) Another academic who viewed Museveni as some sort of Marxist is Gerard Prunier. He wrote in his highly acclaimed book on the Great Lakes Region: "During 1997-1998 this trend briefly tied in with the short-lived craze over the alleged phenomenon of the "New African leaders". There was a naive gushing of enthusiasm in the media ("Museveni sounds like Ronald Reagan. He is bought the whole gospel") and doubters were seen as party-poopers. The former Marxist born-again market economy Democrats were seen as leading forward..." (Prunier, G. 340)

To judge whether Museveni was/is mature ideologically we need a yard stick. That yardstick in our view is a delineation of the version of Marxism that would apply to a third world country like Uganda. Such Marxism is premised on the fact that imperialism has defined the central issues in the third world context and has determined the character of Marxist thought and practice in and about the third world. In this context therefore third world Marxist thought therefore concerns itself with the impact of metropolitan capital (or the capitalist mode of production) on pre-capitalist structures (or modes of production). In the case of Uganda, capitalism was introduced to the area by colonialism; or more accurately we should say the capitalist mode of production was imposed in the area by colonialism. This resulted in the emergence of new social classes in the area, which in turn gave rise to new patterns of class alignments and class contradictions as well as conditions for revolutionary struggles.

We must hasten to point out that the new situation resulting from the imposition of the capitalist mode of production in places like Uganda differs considerably from the situation that classical Marxism of Marx and Engels envisaged. Classical Marxism held the view that once the capitalist mode of production had been introduced in an area, it would move to breakdown the pre-capitalist structures and then go on to generate the dynamics of capitalist accumulation and growth the way it had been done in the initial period of capitalism in Europe. Lenin departed from the trajectory classical Marxism had in mind. He enunciated in his treatise, *Development of capitalism in Russia,* that the situation in Russia was based on a social formation consisting of two modes of production (capitalism and feudalism), with the emerging capitalist mode of production seeking to displace the feudal one. He pointed out that the principal contradiction in Russia at the time was between these two modes of production and which contradiction, he argued, would be resolved by the dissolution of the feudal mode of production. This struggle would constitute what Lenin called a bourgeois-democratic revolution. According to Lenin, unlike the bourgeois revolutions which occurred in Europe before, and which were led by the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia was to be led by the proletariat. The change, Lenin argued, was necessitated by the fact that the bourgeoisie in Russia was not as revolutionary as the bourgeoisie in Europe during the European bourgeoisie revolutions.

Lenin extrapolated his analysis of the development of capitalism in Russia to the colonial situations. With the introduction of capitalism, Lenin argued, a mighty democratic movement was flowering everywhere in Asia and other colonies as it had been in Russia before. Lenin went further to postulate that, unlike in Russia where the bourgeoisie had lost its revolutionary fervor, in the colonies the bourgeoisie was still at the vanguard of the democratic struggles. Lenin thought the bourgeoisie in the colonies needed the nation state to fulfill its needs of capitalist development.

The foregoing delineation of Marxism as applied in a third world situation like Uganda should constitute the backdrop against which we shall review Yoweri Museveni's ideology. The first thing which would strike anybody doing such a review is the haphazard manner in which Museveni uses Marxist concepts. Take the example of the state. When addressing the 5th anniversary of the NRM administration on 26th January 1991, Museveni said: "To serve their purposes the British had created Uganda out of the many pre-colonial states they found had already reached various levels of constitutional development and which had political systems." (Museveni, Y. 2000: 77; also in Museveni, Y 1992: 95) Here by the term state Museveni actually means modes of production. The state as defined in Marxist theory is the instruments of the ruling class or the economically dominant class. The state as an instrument consists of organs such as the army, the judiciary, the police, the civil service etc operating together. Going by this definition of the state, one could say Buganda, Bunyoro and Nkore had some sort of states; however, the rest of what became Uganda had no states or were stateless.

On the other hand a mode of production has been defined as two indissolubly connected sides of production: the productive forces and the relations of production, which respectively represent two sets of relations among people: namely with nature and with each other. Each mode of production has two aspects which define its specificity: base and superstructure. The base is something like the economic frame of the mode of production. It determines the qualitative peculiarities of each mode of production thereby making every mode of production distinct from the others. The superstructure on the other hand is the specifics of the social and spiritual sphere such as ideology, system of government, legal system, culture etc. It is the superstructure which runs the mode of production. And every mode of production is run by its corresponding superstructure. You cannot run a mode of production using the superstructure of another mode of production. At the time of colonisation, Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and Buganda were societies based on the tributary mode of production and therefore had evolved some sort of state machinery. The rest of Uganda was based on the lineage mode of production and so had not yet evolved any state machinery.

From Museveni's lack of a correct concept of modes of production flows anomalies in his analysis. When addressing the then Movement Caucus Retreat in Jinja in 2000 on the theme "Africa's problem is ideological, not scientific", he took occasion to lecture on what he called "five socio-economic systems" by which he actually meant modes of production. At that time Museveni said:

"Within the last 10,000 years, five socio-economic systems have emerged and disappeared and some are still present.

1. The first ones were the primitive communal systems, some of which we still have in Africa amongst some tribes like the Pygmies. The primitive communal systems are where you are hunting and gathering and all

people are equal. There is no chief, but there is a group leader, and there are some rules about how you share the animal when you kill it. This is the earliest social system.

2. The second one is the slave state. That is when certain groups who became strong enslaved others and made them work for them. Rome, Greece and Egypt were slave states at one time. You have read how the children of Israel were slaves in Egypt.

3. Third, you had the feudal system, which still exists in some parts of the world.

4. Then you had the capitalist system; and lastly,

5. The socialist system, which brings us to the present." (Museveni, Y 2014)

We should point out that by socio-economic systems Museveni actually meant modes of production. It is rather ironical that this erroneous definition is coming from a man who is fond of talking about others "misdefining" issues.

Further, from Museveni's lack of a correct concept of modes of production flows anomalies in his analysis. He cannot view colonisation as the imposition of the capitalist mode of production in the area that became what we call Uganda today. And this inability has other analytical implications. When capitalism is first introduced to a place like Uganda before colonisation, it finds itself without the wherewithal to run a capitalist system. In that situation it resorts to subsuming "the labour process as it finds it, it takes over an existing labour process, developed by different and more archaic modes of production.....The work may become more intensive, its duration may be extended, it may become more continuous or orderly under the eye of the interested capitalist, but in themselves these changes do not affect the character of the labour process, the actual mode of working" (Marx, K. 1977: 1021; also quoted in Han, D.R. 1992: 88)

What results out of the articulation of the two modes of production is a social formation or a combination of two or more modes of production operating together. (Berman, B. 1984) The social formation so created was/is pregnant with contradictions. The incoming capitalist mode of production sought to replace the pre-capitalist mode of production. Charles Bettelheim captured this contradiction very well when he said that the pre-capitalist modes of production are "undermined and perpetuated at the same time" in a process he called "conservation-dissolution". (Alavi, H. 1982: 175ff 6) However, as the dissolution or undermining process gets under way, the pre-capitalist modes of production do not take things lying down; they resist and thus giving rise to contradictions. The aspect of "conservation-dissolution" process which most concerns us here is in the realm of the superstructure.

When capitalism was imposed in Uganda, it not only came with its corresponding superstructure, but found the existing pre-capitalist modes of production with their corresponding superstructures. The most intense struggle between the two corresponding superstructures existed in Buganda. One possible explanation for this could be the fact that the Buganda structure was the most refined and developed. A number of struggles between the two superstructures occurred. There were, for instance, the struggles which ended up with the deportation of Kabaka Mutesa in 1953. However, all these struggles remained relatively minor compared to the 1966 struggles. It was these struggles which ended up with the abolition of the monarchies in Uganda. Monarchies, as we know, are an aspect of the superstructure of pre-capitalist societies. As we have already indicated, Museveni never liked these revolutionary occurrences. To really rub in his resentment for the national-democratic revolution of 1966, Museveni even went further and created kings where there had never been kings. The kings Museveni created are sometimes called traditionalist leaders.

Without the modes of production theory which would illuminate his analysis, Museveni resorts to thinking that things just happen by chance. To this effect when addressing the Constituent Assembly in he said: "Hitherto and up to now, black Africa has drawn the worst number in the lottery by having only bureaucrats as being the only ones that constitute the middle class. The bureaucratic elements of the middle class are civil servants, managers of parastatals, soldiers, teachers, professionals. The only thing they have in common is that most of them are not directly producers of wealth but users of wealth produced by others." (CCA 63) And yet this is the very Museveni who once upbraided Makerere students and staff for not understanding the laws that govern the development of society. At that time he said: "That kind of statement shows me part of the problem, and that is why some of us have recommended that we introduce a course on political economy. Perhaps this course

would help you unravel further the dynamics of the laws that govern the development of society. Society does not develop accidentally, as some people seem to think. There are certain basic laws of motion that society, and if the intelligentsia, among others, do not master these laws, no doubt we shall continue to be off course, as has happened before." (Museveni, Y. 2000: 89-90)

The other effect of the lack of a theory of modes of production in Museveni's theoretical framework is on his understanding of the peasantry. This is how Museveni describes the peasant: "So who are the peasants and how do they live? Peasants are very largely, illiterate people who depend on subsistence farming, as opposed to specialisation and exchange, the crucial factors which bring about modernisation, efficiency and the flow of business. But if people are frozen in their subsistence activities, effectively s trying to be jacks of all trades and masters of none, the economy cannot grow and society cannot develop. At present, our people grow their own food; they are their own carpenters, their own masons, even their own doctors. The process of displacing the subsistence economy will mean producing for profit. Once an exchange is created, there is full monetisation of the economy." (Museveni, Y. 1997: 188) It is from this erroneous conception of the peasant that Museveni comes up thinking he not only needs to but can get rid of the peasantry in Uganda. Museveni's Vision 2040 claims it will transform Uganda from a peasant society into a modern middle class one in the next 30 years. This is totally contrary to the guidance of Marxism. To the Marxist, the next revolution will be carried out by the working class in alliance with the peasantry.

We would like to first forcefully point out that there were no peasants in pre-colonial Uganda. Peasants are a creation of the imposition of the capitalist mode of production, something which as we have already pointed out, was done by colonialism. Peasants are the vestiges of the pre-capitalist modes of production. In England which is often given as an example of a country which got rid of peasants, peasants were a vestige of the feudal society which was displaced by capitalism. Over there peasants were not gotten rid of through policy as Museveni has argued. Rather the twin revolutions of the industrial as well as the agricultural revolution were what got rid of the peasant. As industries came into being, there was need for workers in the factories that were arising as a result of the industrial revolution. Simultaneously agriculture was also being mechanised and requiring less and less labour. The two processes which created the capitalist mode of production then operated to squeeze out the peasants into the factories. In other words the emergence of capitalism is what got rid of peasants in England. And so just like the case of England, the peasants in Uganda will not disappear simply because Museveni wishes them to; rather peasants will only cease to exist when there occurs a transformation in the modes of production upon which Ugandan society is based today.

Further, not having the mode of production concept, Museveni has a problem appreciating that with the imposition of the capitalist mode of production, the superstructure of the pre-colonial societies had to change. One cannot run the capitalist mode of production with a superstructure corresponding to the pre-capitalist modes of production. Museveni revealed this deficiency when addressing a law seminar at the Law development Centre on 12 January, 1987 when Museveni said: "The laws we adopted at 'independence, were colonial laws meant to serve the interests of the colonialists. We must revise these laws to suit our people and our present circumstances. Before the colonialists came, we had laws (which have now been dubbed customary laws) and a system of justice that was organically linked to our society and that was understood and respected by our people. The colonialists stopped the development and evolution of this law and imposed a system of justice that remains incomprehensible to the overwhelming majority of our people. Take the marriage law, for example, which we adopted from the British. Because of its alien nature, many people-do not understand it or deliberately ignore its legal consequences. For example, divorce of a wife is allowed-on grounds of adultery. Other grounds of divorce found in our traditional society; like insulting one's spouse's parents, are not permissible under the foreign law we have. The laws we adopt must be meaningful and relevant to our people if they are to earn their respect.' (Museveni, Y. 2000: 2000) This is yet another example of Museveni's failure to realise that colonialism was in essence the imposition of the capitalist mode of production in the areas that became Uganda. Had he realised this, he would *ipso facto* have also realised that when a mode of production is imposed in an area, it does come with its corresponding superstructure. In the case in point the capitalist mode of production had to come with its corresponding superstructure. And that superstructure included a legal system. There was no way one was going to run the capitalist economy with a superstructure of the pre-capitalist modes of production. Admittedly in the initial period, through the process of articulation of modes of production the superstructures of the pre-capitalist modes of production were used (Berman, B. 1984); however, this was done as the pre-capitalist superstructure was being phased out.

The absence of the theory of modes of production in Museveni's theoretical framework does hinder him from understanding the forging of the German nation which he keeps referring to and takes as some sort of

model. In a speech at the opening of a political seminar for NRC members on 6th September 1989, Museveni said: "It was the capitalist middle class that caused the unification of the German states. Until 1870, the Germans were living more or less as we were living here. People in Bavaria and Prussia spoke the same language but they were not politically united. It was the industrialists and capitalists who wanted a united market, and it was they who pushed Bismarck for German unification. " (Museveni, Y. 2000: 173) From this statement it is very clear that not having the concept of mode of mode of production Museveni ends up thinking that a middle class just arises. In Museveni's view there are no specific conditions which give rise to a middle class. Museveni does not realise that the middle class he is talking about is an outgrowth of the capitalist mode of production. However as Stalin taught in his 1913 essay, a group of people living together assumes positive organisation form as a nation under definite historical conditions, belonging to a specific epoch, that of rising capitalism and the struggle of the rising bourgeoisie against feudalism. (Stalin, J.V.)

And so not realising that a nation can only arise from the basis of the capitalist mode of production, Museveni keeps moaning about the absence of a middle class in Africa. He keeps thinking that once a middle class somehow arises, the continent will be integrated: "In Africa, this class does not exist. The middle classes in Africa are not producers of wealth; instead they are salesmen selling other people's products. Fanon said this middle class became senile before they were young. The African middle class is a caricature of the European middle class. Any resemblance between the African middle class and the European middle class is limited merely to the wearing of suits and ties, because in terms of their relationship with the means of production, they could hardly be more different.

In order to have integration, one must use one of two things. You could use either vested economic interests or ideologically committed people who can work for integration if they are intellectually convinced that it is the right thing to do. The churches offer a good example. Although churches have economic interests, they also have evangelists who" preach with conviction. Such people can advance the cause for which they are preaching although they are often used for other, less laudable purposes by some interest groups. If you do not have ideologically committed people and you do not have people with vested interests who can push for integration and, therefore, the stability, of the state, then you are in a crisis." (Museveni, Y. 2000: 173) Here Museveni is totally out of his depths.

He made the same point at the Constitutional assembly when he argued: "There is something else I did not mention an entrepreneurial class. That class of people that have got a sharp nose for profits and profit is what the difference between cost price and selling price. In the history of human and social evolution, one of the most important events was the emergence of the middle class in Europe during and after the middle ages. The European middle class first took on the form of merchants, then industrialists and they are now multifaceted; there are very many types now: financiers, professional, those who work in services sector, bureaucrats, etc. The middle class encourages integration because they want a market for products." (Museveni, Y. in CCA page 63)

NATIONAL--DEMOCRATIC LIBERATION

Apart from the modes of production concept, there is another grave omission in Museveni's theoretical framework. It is the theory of national-democratic liberation. Theory and practice have demonstrated that struggles occur in phases. We went through the anti-colonial struggles which went on between the beginning of colonisation around 1900 and the end of colonialism in 1962. From there we are now in the phase of national-democratic liberation. By national-democratic liberation is meant struggles which begin with the struggles to end colonialism and then proceeded after the attainment of independence. These struggle are against imperialism as well as internal domination and other forms of oppression. The forces for national-democratic liberation are normally assisted by other anti-imperialist forces around the world and those against national-democratic liberation are assisted by imperialism.

Without a theory of national-democratic liberation, Museveni could neither appreciate that the national-democratic struggles began in the terminal days of colonialism nor appreciate the injustices that was obtaining and that national-democratic liberation was to right. To this effect he wrote: "For them, the enemy was not the colonial system that have caused Africa to miss out on the great human revolution from pre-capitalist modes of production; the enemy was their neighbour, who happened to be of a different religion or tribe." (Museveni, Y. 1997: 200-201) It is not that struggles were not being waged against colonialism. While colonialism was being fought, the next phase of the struggle--that of national-democratic liberation was also beginning. Museveni's

interpretation that "...the enemy was their neighbour who happens to be of a different religion or tribe" is not accurate. It misses two important facts. One, that identities can be based on tribe (nationality) or religion. Secondly, it misses the point that identities can oppress one another. This oppression then gives rise to struggle or contradiction between the oppressed and oppressing identities. It is the struggle between the oppressed and oppressing identities which Museveni views as enmity between neighbours.

While the struggles for national-democratic liberation went on right from the terminal period of colonialism, it was not characterised as the struggle for national-democratic liberation; instead the protagonists classified themselves as leftists and rightists or were viewed so. This unscientific characterisation was seized upon by Museveni and used to dismiss the struggles for national-democratic liberation. To this effect, at a conference held at Mweya on 3rd May 1990, Museveni argued: "In Uganda for instance, in 1980 and earlier on, we had political groups that had existed since the days of colonial rule. These groups were artificially divided between those called "leftist" and others called "rightist." But when you examined them closely, there was no substance as to why one was called rightist and the other leftist. These were simply opportunistic groupings seeking platforms from which to seek external support. When some people want to get aid from the Russians, they say they are leftist; when they want to get aid from America, they say they are rightist. But when you examine the content of their programs, there is nothing that shows that they are either one thing or the other." (Museveni, Y. 2000: 168) Of course without a theory of national-democratic liberation Museveni was bound not to see the difference. However, the difference is clear: those who called themselves or were called leftists were the ones waging the struggle for national-democratic liberation; and those against national-democratic liberation were/are the ones called rightists.

With this frame of mind, Museveni could not understand the struggles that went on immediately after independence. He does not appreciate that independence was just a threshold to usher in struggles against internal oppression as well as imperialism. Frederick Engels once said: "So long as a viable nation is fettered by an alien conqueror, it necessarily directs all its efforts, all its aspirations and all its energy against the external enemy; so long as its internal life is paralyzed in this way, it is incapable of fighting for social emancipation." (Engels, F. 1869; also quoted in Brutents, K.N 1977:168) This same view of Engels was later expanded by Professor Wallerstein when he argued: "By ethnic (read nationality) I mean the sentiment shared by a group of people who define their boundary in cultural terms (a common language religion, color, history, style of life rights in the political arena in order to defend the possibilities of their material conditions. Whether such a group prefers to call itself a nation, a nationality, or an ethnic group, a tribe, a people or any of the other sundry terms that are used is not very material to the fact that ethnic consciousness is latent everywhere but it is only realized when groups feel either threatened with loss of previously acquired privilege or conversely feel it is an opportune moment politically to overcome long-standing denial of privilege." (Wallerstein, I. 1973: 168)

The struggles for national-democratic liberation first surfaced in a serious manner at the UPC delegate's conference held in Gulu in 1964. The most significant thing that occurred at the conference was the election of the Secretary General of the UPC. The elections pitted John Kakonge who represented the forces of national-democratic liberation against Grace Ibingira, who represented the camp of the forces against national-democratic liberation. Grace Ibingira who had the support of the notables of the party won. Following his victory at the Gulu Conference, Grace Ibingira immediately left for the US to lobby for support as well as shop for funds. While in the US, Ibingira and his supporters made statements to the effect that Dr Obote would soon be out of office and the US could expect a more friendly and responsible government when they assume power. (Andre de la Rue 1967 part two page 24; also see Adhola, Y. 2014)

Obote's struggles for national-democratic liberation were to win him a lot of support from African leaders waging the struggle for national-democratic liberation. Bereft of the theory of national-democratic liberation, Museveni could not understand why countries with progressive leadership were in solidarity with Obote. To this effect Museveni wrote: "The alleged overthrow of feudalism in Uganda by Obote in 1966 led various countries, especially leftist ones to regard him as a lonely revolutionary who was battling against all-powerful feudal forces in Uganda, especially in Buganda! In fact, the misunderstanding of this aspect of the political crisis in Uganda, throughout the independence period, contribute to the country's ever-deepening crisis. Some African leaders were victims of this distortion and continued supporting Obote long after he had stopped serving any useful purpose for the people of Uganda. The crucial question to consider in this connection is whether feudalism was the principal framework within which production, distribution and exchange were carried out in Uganda of the 1960s." (Museveni, Y. 1997: 43) The distinction Museveni is making here between imperialism and feudalism (or the pre-capitalist social forces) is immaterial. National-democratic liberation is both against imperialism as well oppressive and moribund vestiges of the pre-capitalist modes of production. In any case of

what value is drawing the distinction Museveni is making when imperialism and the feudal and other pre-capitalist reactionary forces invariably end up allying.

IMPERIALISM

Another major shortcoming in Museveni's theoretical framework is the absence of a theory of imperialism. Museveni does not realise that with the onset of imperialism in the late 19th century, the economic production and reproduction of the world are all integrated. Put in other words the whole world has become one capitalist economic system. And this one world economic system, has various levels of relationship of the various parts. There is the center of the economic system which is the metropole and there is the periphery which includes economies like that of Uganda. The other thing which Museveni doesn't appreciate is that with the onset of imperialism, the previous independent development of economies like the pre-capitalist economies that obtained in Uganda was stopped and what became the Ugandan economy became part and parcel of the world economic system.

Contrary to this theory, Museveni was to make the following statement: "Another problem confronting the state in Africa is the pre-capitalist nature of African societies today. African societies are still living either at the clan or, in some cases feudal level of organisation. Hardly any African state has reached the capitalist stage." (Museveni, Y. 2000: 172) Here Museveni is going by the introductory course he was given in historical materialism where for pedagogical purposes the evolution of human society as a whole was presented as following a pattern or a sequence from primitive communism through feudalism to capitalism. Museveni is not aware that with the onset of imperialism, development in places like Uganda got catapulted from whatever stage in pre-capitalist development various societies had been to the level of peripheral capitalism. Contrary to this, Museveni still expects Uganda to go through the same stages that England went through to arrive at capitalism. Yet going by the theory of imperialism we set out above, Uganda is already at the capitalist stage Museveni is crying for; it is only that it is peripheral capitalism.

Constrained by the same theoretical framework he acquired from the introductory course on historical materialism we have referred to, Museveni ended up thinking that Africa is still stuck at the pre-capitalist stage of social evolution. To this effect he wrote in his book, **Sowing the Mustard Seed**, that: "For them, the enemy was not the colonial system that have caused Africa to miss out on the great human revolution from pre-capitalist modes of production; the enemy was their neighbour, who happened to be of a different religion or tribe." (Museveni, Y. 1997: 200-201) One could not find a better illustration of a charlatan than this. While pretending knowledge, Museveni is actually revealing his ignorance. It is a well-known fact that colonialism was the imposition of the capitalist mode of production in places like Uganda; that being the case, how can one again turn round and argue that colonialism caused Africa to miss out on the so-called great human evolution from pre-capitalist modes of production?

Museveni's lack of a theory of imperialism also makes him not understand the real import of independence. He somehow thinks independence was some sort of revolution which should have ushered in tremendous changes. He does not realise that much as independence has some significance in the struggle against imperialism, it was not only partially inspired by imperialism itself but could not have achieved the expectations Museveni has for it. In this regard, during his address on the fifth anniversary of the NRM administration on 26th January 1991 Museveni said: "The question of what political, economic, and social institutions Uganda should have was never seriously addressed when the British relinquished power in 1962. We thus became independent nation on the basis of institutions the British had left in place." (Museveni, Y. 2000: 77) The kind of consideration Museveni is talking about could only be done in a situation where a revolution was unfolding. Such revolutionary change was not taking place around the time of independence in Uganda. Uganda was simply being transformed from a colony into a neo colony. While such a change did usher in a black social class into power, it did not result in changes in the economy or the state. The economy was still an extension of the British economy and the state which had evolved in the colonial days had to remain intact.

Without a theory of imperialism, Museveni cannot explain the economic crisis that Third World countries (including Uganda) face. In attempt to explain the crisis to Makerere students and staff, he said: "This is why you see that the state in Africa is now in a crisis, as the theme of your conference states. The regimes that said they were rightist are in a state of crisis; those that said they were leftist are also in a state of crisis. So what is the problem? How can they all be in crisis? That means there is something fundamentally wrong. The main problem is that our leaders did not find time to define the issues confronting them. They borrowed foreign ideas

and superimposed them on their countries: this could not, and did not, work.

If you examine the scene in Africa, it is quite difficult to find a model solution. Those who followed the planned economy system got into very serious problems with their economies; those who adopted the so-called • market forces approach fared no better either. In very few cases was there real structural economic transformation to generate sustained growth. Those who adopted the planned economy approach overextended the involvement of the state and went into all sorts of little ventures, which in itself undermined production. The economy was taken over by bureaucrats who had no interest in it and the consequence was that the population was not given a chance to take part in meaningful production. Economies that adopted the market forces approach concentrated on producing raw materials like coffee and tea, but these were not integrated with the industrial sector. Therefore, whenever there is a price crisis, it is heavily reflected in the concerned country. Capitalist-oriented regimes were successful only for as long as commodity prices were high. My personal view, therefore, is that we should have used a mixture of market force and planned economy approaches, depending on convenience and individual countries' circumstances." (Museveni, Y. 2000: 168-69)

The answer to the question about why Africa has not moved to become a developed capitalist situation is not because the African economies are not integrated as Museveni claims; nor is it because Africa is dependent on merely the export of raw materials. The answer is in the structural connection between economies of all Africa (as well as all the third world) to imperialism. This structural connection denies economies like that of Uganda the use of the economic surplus generated in the economy for development purposes. Whatever economic surplus might be generated is siphoned off to the economies of developed capitalist countries as repatriation of profits, or repayment of loans or deposit of the loot of corrupt officials. "The problem is thus not a lack of development, but an underdevelopment of the domestic economy; undermining its potential for development due to appropriation of an investable surplus which could generate and sustain growth." (Bottomore, T. 1983: 498) This process is what in economics jargon is called underdevelopment.

The problem of underdevelopment has been well-diagnosed by Gunder Frank. In his diagnosis he theoretically combined the concepts of surplus absorption and utilisation with a model of the world economy structured in such a manner that there is the duality of, on the one hand, the metropolitan economies and, on the other, satellite (third world) economies. He then argues that industrialised metropolitan economies dominate underdeveloped satellite economies through an expropriation of their surpluses itself resulting from the imposition of an export oriented capitalist development. According to Frank the alleviation of underdevelopment can only occur during periods when the metropolitan economies retreat or withdraw. This is so because, as he explains, underdevelopment is always caused by imperialist penetration. He then concludes: "...short of liberation from this capitalist structure or the dissolution of the world capitalist system as a whole, the capitalist satellite countries, regions, localities, and sectors are condemned to underdevelopment." (Frank, A.G. 1969 also quoted in Bottomore, T. 499)

The solution to this problem of underdevelopment can therefore not be found in integration which brings about large markets as Museveni postulates. Integration and the consequent emergence of large markets will only bring about larger markets for imperialism. It would not bring about the end of transferring the surplus of the Ugandan (Third World) economy to serve the interests of the metropolitan economy. The answer to this problem can only be found in a situation where the economic surplus so generated is used to develop the domestic economy. This can only come about the way Gunder Frank has suggested.

In his book, "Sowing the Mustard Seed", Museveni upbraids Obote for not understanding imperialism. "In fact people like Obote did not comprehend imperialism in the neocolonial phase." (Museveni, Y. 1997: 44) However, Museveni himself does not understand imperialism. Addressing the Institute of Strategic Studies in London on 27th September 1990 Museveni argued: "The most fundamental cleavage in human society over the past 400 or 500 years was caused by the phenomenon of modern imperialism. This was the phenomenon of the emerging middle class in Europe seeking cheap raw materials, cheap labour, secure markets for exports and, later on markets for investable capital in search for high profit margins." (Museveni, Y 1992: 245; also found in Museveni, Y. 2000: 223-24) It is sad that Museveni gave this as his understanding of imperialism to an audience as learned as the one he was addressing. They must have seen through him and ended up viewing him as nothing but a charlatan.

Apart from Museveni's inability to explain what imperialism is, one would have thought the purpose of understanding imperialism which Museveni claims he does is to resist it; however, comparing the two, Obote

left a record of greater resistance to imperialism compared to that of Museveni. As a matter of fact imperialism had not only to overthrow Obote in 1971 but went on to resist his return to power in 1979. About this resistance we have the words of the then British Foreign Secretary, Dr Owen. Dr Owen wrote in his memoirs: "But the Amin issue did not go away. Later he was ousted by Tanzanian armed intervention, and we aided Julius Nyerere in the attempt. I will never be sure whether it was wise to do so. The price we extracted from Nyerere for our material support was the promise that a mild, decent former children's doctor should be President rather than Milton Obote. Unfortunately the doctor did not have the necessary authority. The end result was that Obote returned to the Presidency, Uganda was riven again and human rights were trampled. Although not quite as bad as Amin's, Obote's rule was still a disaster." (Owen, D 1991) On the other hand, despite his claim of understanding imperialism, Museveni has been a consistent instrument of imperialism in the African continent. Museveni was used by British and American imperialism to eradicate French influence in Rwanda. The Americans were also to use him to get rid of Mobutu. He is ``currently being used by the Americans to fight the American war in Somalia. (Fisher, J: 2012)

Museveni's lack of a theory of imperialism has also affected his characterization as well as diagnosis of what is ailing the Ugandan economy. When addressing Makerere University staff and students on 8th June 1991, Museveni retorted to an argument put to him on the economy: "This is exactly what has been happening. Why do you think Africa has not moved? If the good old days were as good, why couldn't our economy not sustain itself? It was not integrated and could not function properly because it was dependent on the production of export of raw materials including coffee." (Museveni, Y. 2001: 90)

"Point number ten of our political program prescribes an economic strategy of a mixed economy. We must stress that it is neither pro-West, nor pro-East: it is pro-Uganda. We reject dogmatism, oversimplification, theoretical vulgarization, and grafting. We take from every system what is best for us and we reject what is bad for us. We do not judge the economic programs of other nations because we believe that each nation knows best how to address the needs, of its-people: Let us hope that although we are a small nation, no outside power will presume to prescribe what is best for our economy and our people. We have-got our legitimate interests and we judge friend and foe according to how they relate to our interests.

Those countries with a tourist industry cannot, in most cases, service it on their own. For instance, the cornflakes, jam, cheese, and wines to feed the tourists all come from outside the Third World. So-called factories are, therefore, no more than assembly plants." (Museveni 183-184)

It is sad to hear Museveni as president say or write this. It shows that Museveni is neither a conscious reactionary nor anti-imperialist. He just is unaware of what is happening in the world economic system. He doesn't know that with the expansion of world trade and the rise of world trade, there has developed since the days of colonialism, an international economic system in which production and reproduction of all societies is integrated. That that world economic integration falls into two categories: the center (or the metropole) and the periphery. What Museveni here calls the west is the center of the capitalist world and what he calls the East is the erstwhile socialist countries which were anti-imperialist. Going by this, it is clear Museveni is not even aware of the struggle against imperialism nor where in the scheme of things Uganda should be. This statement just demonstrates that Museveni doesn't know Uganda is a peripheral capitalist economy.

SOCIAL IDENTITY

Museveni has a weird theory of social identity. Museveni wrote in his book, *The Mustard Seed: the struggle for freedom and democracy in Uganda* as follows: "... pre-capitalist polarization based on identity rather than rationality can be quite injurious to a country" (Museveni, Y 1997: 187 also quoted in Kassmir, R. 1999: 654). This is not accurate. We know that developed capitalist countries have identity issues. Canada has the problem of its French-speaking citizens who occupy the Quebec Province of Canada and who have tried many times in vain to break away from English-speaking Canada. We also know that Belgium has serious identity issues to the point where it once went without a government for four years. We could quote more instances, but we shall sum it all up in the words of Professor Gitlin who argued: "This logic is more than a way of thought. Identity politics is a "form of self-understanding, an orientation toward the world, and a structure of feeling which is characteristic of developed industrial societies. (For purposes of this discussion I beg the juicy question or whether it is characteristic of human societies altogether.)" (Gitlin, T. 154) What Professor Gitlin is saying here is that identity politics is not just limited to pre-capitalist societies. In fact, as far as he is concerned, identity politics is an issue of developed capitalist countries; he simply wonders whether it is not also found in the pre-capitalist societies.

During his address on the 5th anniversary of the NRM administration on January 26 1991, Museveni said: "The polarisation of society along ethnic and religious lines cannot form a basis of democracy and Uganda's recent history has proved this point again and again." (Museveni, Y 2000: 82) Here Museveni is referring to UPC whose social base is the resistance to the domination by Baganda of the identities that formed UPC against Buganda domination and DP which arose out of the discrimination of Catholics since the 1892 battle of Mengo. Social identities have been defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." (Tajfel, H: 1981: 254) Social identity satisfies the human need for people to self-identify themselves as well as socially locate and moor themselves. It satisfies the human need to identify with others in a shared culture. "The need for identity does not, standardly drive people to seek to achieve an identity, and that is so for two reasons. The first is that people do not usually lack identity: they receive an identity as a byproduct of the rearing process. The right thing to say in most cases, is not that people are motivated by their need for identity, but they are motivated by their identity, for which they have a strong need, and the motivating power of identity reflects the need it fulfills. Quebecois do not have a need for identity which drives them to become Quebecois. Since they are raised Quebecois, their need for identity is readily satisfied. Quebecois are motivated not to acquire an identity but to protect and celebrate the identity they are given." (Cohen, G.A. 348) For political reasons Museveni refused to recognize issues concerning either nationalities or religious groupings as legitimate identity issues. He also refused to accept that some identities can marshal power with which to oppress other identities. He also limits his recognition of social identities simply to what the NRM calls political minorities. Mamdani found these distinctions so untenable that he paused the following question: "Secondly, what groups are to be given these rights? Are they to be what the N.R.M. in Uganda defines as 'political minorities', such as women, workers, and youth? Should oppressed communities, such as certain nationalities and religious groups, also be included? If so, then is the relevant core right not that of self-determination, but the twin right to non-discrimination and equality? But can this be either struggled for, or safeguarded, without exercising the right of autonomous organisation." (Mamdani, M. 1990: 373)

The other time Museveni displayed his ignorance of the issues of social identity was when he addressed. That time he said: ".....I would like to recapitulate for you that when we got independence, we had already got into complications of misdefinition of problems. Ideological bankruptcy is always characterised by misdefinition of problems. At that time, the main political question being asked was: "What is Buganda's position in independent Uganda?" This was a big problem and it caused a lot of friction. The question was not what would people eat; or will the children go to school or not; but it was the position of Buganda in an independent Uganda! They said that the answer was to have federo." (Museveni 2014) This quote abundantly demonstrates that Museveni does not appreciate the issues on the eve of independence. Professor Kiwanuka tells us Buganda became a dominant power in the region that we now call Uganda around 1600. From that time, for 300 years, Buganda remained a dominant power. Its dominance was eventually interrupted by the British when they came to colonise. In the initial period the Baganda were used as mercenaries to subjugate other nationalities. Later they were used as initial administrators.

Throughout the colonial period Buganda had been treated in a differential manner as compared to the other identities. As Uganda approached independence the Baganda began to fear that the special position that they had had during colonial days might not obtain after independence. They also feared the prospect of being ruled by a non-Muganda. Professor Mutibwa tells us how the prospect of being ruled by a non-Muganda sent the Baganda into a panic: As a reaction to the publication of the Wild Report, whose Committee Mengo had boycotted, Buganda authorities decided to demand once again separate independence for their kingdom. The Baganda appear to have been in a near panic. There were attempts to form a party of their own - the Uganda National Party (UNP) which, it was even suggested could merge with the new UPC. It was all a gamble, especially as the Mengo Establishment was faced, apparently for the first time, with fears that Obote might become Uganda's first Prime Minister. Certainly the prospects of being governed by a non-Muganda filled the Baganda with dismay. It is against this background that the decision to renew the demand for separate independence by 1 January 1961 should be viewed. (Mutibwa, P.M. 2008: 32) Buganda made moves to secede. It is in response to these moves and as a way of persuading Buganda to remain in Uganda that the Relationship Commission recommended that Buganda fears should be handled by a federal arrangement. (Munster, Lord) What Museveni does not realise is that had Buganda fears not been so handled through a federal arrangement, Buganda could have easily made attempts at secession. To stop such attempts could have necessitated a war.

LAWS THAT GOVERN DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY

Much as Museveni boasts of knowing the laws that govern the evolution of society, a closer examination of his writing and speeches reveal a man who is very ignorant of these laws. When addressing Makerere students at Freedom Square, Makerere University, Kampala on 8th June 1991, for instance, he argued: "The issues we are dealing with here are not secret matters — they can all be discussed publicly. I shall start by taking issue with the Guild President, who talked' about "the good old days." It worries me when I hear university students in 1991 talking about "the good old colonial days." That kind of-statement shows me part of the problem, and that is why some of us have recommended that we introduce a course on political economy. Perhaps this course will help you unravel further the dynamics of laws that govern the development of society. Society does not develop accidentally or haphazardly, as some people seem to think. There are certain basic laws of motion that govern society, and if the intelligentsia, among others, does not master these laws, no doubt we shall continue to be off course, as happened before in Africa." (Museveni Y. 1992: 107; 2000: 89-90) Contrary to this boast, Museveni's knowledge of the laws that govern the development of society is questionable. Writing in his book, *"Sowing the Mustard Seed"*, Museveni argued:

"Sectarianism is a consequence of an incomplete social metamorphosis. In other countries, society has been changing continually - initially in Europe from a two- class society of feudal lords and peasants and, by 1789, a four-class society of feudalists, the bourgeoisie (or middle class), the proletariat (urban working class), and the remnants of the peasant class. Now Europe is again basically a two-class society, of the middle and working class. In the United Kingdom, the middle class, made up of professionals and businessmen, makes up 52 per cent of the population, the working class makes up 46 per cent, and the upper class 2 per cent. Therefore, in its metamorphosis society in Europe has gone through several stages in order to reach its present state, just as a butterfly or a cockroach does. The insect's first form of life is an egg, which develops into a larva, then a pupa, after which it matures into a fully-fledged butterfly or cockroach.

The problem with Africa is that not only has its society not metamorphosed, it has actually regressed. When the British explorer seeking the source of the Nile, John Hanning Speke, came to Uganda in 1862, many of the societies here had three classes - a feudal class, an artisan class and a peasant class. Both the feudal and artisan classes were wiped out and Uganda effectively regressed into becoming an almost exclusively peasant society. The situation now is that 92 per cent of the population are peasants." (Museveni, Y. 187-188)

While we agree that society in Europe, like society everywhere else, has been changing, we do not buy the measurement Museveni is using to indicate the change. Change in society is not indicated by the number of social classes in a society; rather it is indicated by modes of production. And if we are to talk about changes in European society, we need to do so by indicating the various modes of production that Europe has gone through. It is modes of production which indicate the various stages through which society has gone. Europe has reached the capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, at the time of the arrival of Speke in Uganda, societies in Uganda were at either at the tributary mode of production (with regard to Buganda Bunyoro, Toro and Nkore) and the rest of Uganda was at the lineage mode of production. Today Uganda is a peripheral capitalist society in which the various pre-capitalist modes of production have been articulated to the capitalist mode of production. (Berman, Bruce 1984; Alavi, H 172)

Another time Museveni demonstrated ignorance of the laws that govern the development of society was when he addressed the Dag Hammarskjold Conference on "The Crisis of the State in Africa" held at Mweya, Uganda on 13th May 1990. At the time Museveni argued: "When the imperial powers started penetrating Africa, the process of state formation--the amalgamation of clans into tribes and of tribes into nations--was beginning to crystallize in different places throughout the continent, although it had not yet become consolidated. Some empires had emerged in west, central, and east Africa, but there was no urgency for the formation of centralized states. When you are living in 'the tropics with a small population, there is no great urge for one clan to go and conquer another in order to form an empire. The problems we face here are not so numerous. If you live in the Middle East, however, you have a lot of urge to conquer others because you need their resources. Here each clan can stay in its own-area: once in a while they all go and raid cattle from another clan, but they will come back home. There is no great need to establish hegemony over other people." (Museveni, Y. 2000:

172) He made the same point when launching the Constituent Assembly that promulgated the 1995 constitution: "A phenomenon that made political integration those days--not a priority and militated against inventions in science and technology because of absence of pressure from nature; no extreme temperatures and in the absence of competition between man and man over natural resources. The fact that the population was small, not big in the past did not make it necessary to go and conquer another tribe. But it was not absolutely necessary." (CCA 62)

Theoretically what Museveni is saying here is not correct. The desire of one group to conquer other groups did not arise from the size of the particular groupings who would have the desire to conquer others; rather, as Samir Amin has theorised, it arose from the ruling class of a particular group seeking to compensate what it had lost inside its own group: "Finally, class struggle within the tributary mode explains, at least in part, the external policy of the tributary class. This class seeks to compensate for what it loses inside the society it exploits by an expansionist policy aimed at subjugating other peoples and replacing their exploiting classes. This is the motivation behind all tributary wars, including feudal wars. At times the tributary class has even been able to mobilize the people for this type of venture. This may be compared with the dependence of external policy on internal class struggle under capitalism, even though the capitalist law of accumulation is of a different type. And it can also be compared with the alliance of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of an externally oriented country under imperialism, following the prediction of Marx and Engels for England and the plan of action drawn up by Cecil Rhodes." (Amin, S. 1980: 55)

Further, contrary to what Museveni is saying here, the history of pre-colonial Uganda too is littered with instances of the kingdom of Bunyoro conquering other nationalities. Later after 1600 when Buganda became a dominant power in the region as we have detailed in chapter, Buganda conquered other parts of the territory that became Uganda. From the reign of Kimera, the third Kabaka of Buganda until Katerega, the 14th Kabaka, Buganda consisted of Busiro, Mawokota, Busuju and possibly part of Butambala. The county (saza) of Kyagwe was annexed in the reign of Juko, the 16th Kabaka of Buganda. Kyagwe had been part of the territories of Namuyonjo, the Munyara potentate of Bugerere. The Njanza were a group inhabiting the area but were later conquered and assimilated into Buganda. A good deal of territorial additions is linked up with the reign of Katerega (the 14th Kabaka of Buganda). He is credited with adding Butambala and one of his generals is said to have conquered most of Gomba which had been Bunyoro territory. Kyabagu, the 25th Kabaka of Buganda at one time after a raid of Busoga temporarily settled in Jinja. According to Bishop Gorju, Kyabagu also added Singo to Buganda by conquest. Junju (26) added Budu to Buganda in the second half of the eighteenth century and Kamanya's (28) generals conquered from Bunyoro or Bunyoro's tributaries the extreme west of Gomba, Buwekula, northern Bulemezi and southern Bugerere. Largely with the assistance of the British, the 1890s was a period of expansion for Buganda. This is the time when the Buvuma islands were conquered and annexed to Buganda. It was in the very same period that Kabula and Mawogola were captured from Nkore (later Ankole kingdom). Buyaga, Bugangaizi and northern Singo and Buruli were captured from Bunyoro and added to Buganda. Last but not least in 1896 the British pressurized the small but independent kingdom of Koki to join Buganda and become a county (saza). (Cox, A.H.)

The economics ideology of Museveni

A very striking thing in Museveni's economic ideology is the absence of imperialism. This is well demonstrated in the Ten Point Program: "Point number ten of our political program prescribes an economic strategy of a mixed economy. We must stress that it is neither pro-West, nor pro-East: it is pro-Uganda. We reject dogmatism, oversimplification, theoretical vulgarization, and grafting. We take from every system what is best for us and we reject what is bad for us. We do not judge the economic programs of other nations because we believe that each nation knows best how to address the needs, of its-people: Let us hope that although we are a small nation, no outside power will presume to prescribe what is best for our economy and our people. We have-got our legitimate interests and we judge friend and foe according to how they relate to our interests." (Museveni 183) It is ironic that Museveni who once chided Obote for not understanding imperialism (NOTES) can write such. This statement clearly shows that Museveni has no idea that with the emergence of imperialism, the whole world became one capitalist economy. What he calls "East" are the socialist economies which were anti-imperialist and what he designates "West" are the metropolis of capitalism, the real centers of the capitalist world. This being the case, this talk of taking from every system is just meaningless; Uganda is a peripheral capitalist economy. If Museveni were to understand this simple fact, he would not make the following statement: "Another problem confronting the state in Africa is the pre-capitalist nature of African societies today. African societies are still living either at clan or, in some cases, at feudal levels of organization. Hardly

any African state has reached the capitalist stage." (Museveni, Y. 2000: 172; 1992: 192) This statement has been lifted directly from the economics course Museveni had for his A Level studies.

The economics ideology of Museveni stems from the economics he was taught at his A levels. The economics syllabus at the time Museveni was doing his A levels had a course on what was called stages of economic growth. The material for teaching this course was/is taken directly from the book by W.W. Rostow, "Stages of Economic Growth". Rostow was a right-wing professor of economic history at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He theorised that all societies go through five stages, namely

1. Traditional society
2. Preconditions for take-off
3. Take-off
4. Drive to maturity
5. Age of high mass consumption

This Rostovian stages of economic growth does not take into account the emergence of capitalism and later imperialism. With the emergence of imperialism, the economy of the whole world became capitalist and the previously independent development of various economies was blocked. The whole world economy then became divided into two classes: the developed capitalist countries and the underdeveloped ones, or better still the center and the periphery. It is only in recent times that we have had what is called the brics economies emerging in between the two categories.

Museveni also initially embraced an infantile leftist economics view. An aspect of this infantile lefts economics ideology was the view that since they had carried out a revolution, they could not deal with the IMF and World Bank the way Obote had done. They were going to avoid the two institutions like a plague. Obviously this view was not taking into account the fact that Uganda is a peripheral capitalist economy. That being the case, the economy is ultimately run or subject to the two institutions. Ignorant of this fact, Museveni initially tried to avoid the two institutions initially. He sought to bypass the two institutions. However, he eventually realised that without a World Bank certification, no financial institution was going to deal with him. And this was not before a very embarrassing incident. The embarrassment consisted of the NRM government being forced to eat its words. The late Joshua Mugenyi, a high level NRM cadre wrote in an article that on 15 May 1987, the government announced a comprehensive IMF-supported package that had all the ingredients of shock such as tough budgetary measures, massive devaluation from Uganda shillings 14 to a dollar to Uganda shillings 60. This was a condition to be fulfilled before the IMF could release funds; however, before that was done, the government announced budget measures that contradicted the agreed package. This unleashed a crisis. Within a week a Uganda negotiating team was in Washington, and within days of their arrival, the NRM was 'persuaded' to abandon its budget and make a new one (or else the agreed programme and funding would be called off). The results is what is popularly known as the Telex Budget, referring to the intense negotiations between Kampala and Washington as the new budget took shape." (Mugenyi, Y. 1991: 71)

Museveni also wrote: To posit that "...this social configuration, this social structure, this social picture has got consequences for both the economy and the politics as far as the economy is concerned, since historically, the middle class has everywhere in the whole world been the entrepreneurial class; its absence means low productivity, low economic activity as far as entrepreneurship in concerned."(Museveni, Y. found in CCA page 146) for both the economy and politics is not correct. What Museveni is talking about should be seen as an aspect of the character and nature of a third world country or more correctly, a peripheral capitalist economy. Third World countries by virtue of not being industrialised have most of their populations living in rural areas. On the other hand the developed capitalist countries such as Britain which Museveni is talking about have the majority of their populations living in cities. Further, Museveni is wrong to think that you could somehow have what he calls a middle class injected in large numbers into Uganda. To have the kind of middle class Museveni is wishing for, the Ugandan economy would have had to be transformed into a developed capitalist economy. With that kind of change the middle class Museveni is talking about would not need a policy to bring it about; it would arise automatically. We must hasten to point out that what we are giving out is a theoretical postulate; the reality is that with the advent of imperialism, development in countries like Uganda can no longer lead to developed capitalist countries like Britain. That was possible in the Britain of the 18th century because that economy then was undeveloped; that of Uganda today is underdeveloped.

Strategy for the so-called revolution:

In his university days, Museveni got acquainted with the writings of and became a keen student of Regis Debray. Regis Debray was a Frenchman who went to Cuba soon after the revolution and got very close to both Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. While in Cuba, he taught Philosophy at the University of Havana. He also wrote about the Cuban Revolution. In his so-called armed struggle, Museveni was guided by the theories of Regis Debray, and in particular the *foco* theory. While following the *foco* theory, Museveni did not realize that the theory had long been discredited. This was long before Museveni read it. The theories had not only been based on an erroneous reading of the Cuban revolution, it was also not based on solid science. To Regis Debray the Cuban revolution began with the attack on the Moncada barracks in. The reality is that by the attack, struggles had gone on for 100 years. It is these struggles which had prepared the situation for revolution. (Lenin, V) Without such preparation, Museveni thought he could duplicate what Castro and his comrades had done and also bring about a revolution in Uganda. The other defect in the theoretical framework of Regis Debray was the exclusion of the Illanos from the struggle in his account of the Cuban revolution. The Illanos had waged most of the struggles not only before Fidel Castro, by default became the leader of the struggles but also long before the *siera* group attacked the Moncada barracks.. (Childs, M.D.) Without the struggles waged by the Illanos, there is no way the Cuban revolution could have taken place. And there was no equivalent of the Illanos in Uganda when Museveni was waging his so-called revolutionary struggles. This coupled with the fact that the revolutionary situation as defined by Lenin (Lenin, V) had not matured in Uganda, ensured that Museveni's so-called revolutionary struggles was bound to fail. In July 1985 there occurred a military coup in Uganda. Museveni wasted no time in claiming the coup as an aspect of his struggles. What he did not realise is that the coup ushered him into power the way Engels described in his essay, "The Peasant War in Germany". About situations like that in which Museveni found himself upon getting to power in 1986, Engels wrote: " The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents and for the realisation of the measures which that domination would imply. What he *can* do depends not upon his will but upon the sharpness of the clash of interests between the various classes, and upon the degree of development of the material means of existence, the relations of production and means of communication upon which the clash of interests of the classes is based every time. What he *ought* to do, what his party demands of him, again depends not upon him, or upon the degree of development of the class struggle and its conditions. He is bound to his doctrines and the demands hitherto propounded which do not emanate from the interrelations of the social classes at a given moment, or from the more or less accidental level of relations of production and means of communication, but from his more or less penetrating insight into the general result of the social and political movement. Thus he necessarily finds himself in a dilemma. What he *can* do is in contrast to all his actions as hitherto practised, to all his principles and to the present interests of his party; what he *ought* to do cannot be achieved. In a word, he is compelled to represent not his party or his class, but the class for whom conditions are ripe for domination. In the interests of the movement itself, he is compelled to defend the interests of an alien class and to feed his own class with phrases and promises, with the assertion that the interests of that alien class are their own interests. Whoever puts himself in this awkward position is irrevocably lost." (Engels, F.)

Conclusion/Summary

. The object of this essay was to evaluate the ideology of Yoweri Museveni. We set off on the assumption that the ideology Museveni embraces is some sort of Marxism. The standard against which we have evaluated Museveni's Marxism is the Marxist This Marxism is composed of several components, some of which we have dealt with in this essay: modes of production, the theory of national-democratic liberation, With regard to modes of production, we have demonstrated that Museveni had no idea as to what modes of production are. As a matter of fact he viewed modes of production as systems. By so doing he totally missed the vitality of the theory of modes of production as a tool of analysis.

We have also demonstrated that Museveni does not embrace the theory of national-democratic liberation. Without the theory of national-democratic liberation Museveni could not understand the struggles that went on in the terminal period of colonialism nor those immediately after independence. He could not have a long-range strategy either.

The other aspect of Uganda society which Museveni analyses is social identity. Museveni's view of social

identity is self-serving. At the time Museveni stumbled into power in 1986, there were two powerful political parties based on issues of social identity. There was no way Museveni would compete with the two parties. To offset this deficiency, Museveni decided among other things to delegitimise the political parties by distorting their social bases. He characterised social identity negatively as being sectarian.

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